When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations by Katz, Avery W.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1996 
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations 
Avery W. Katz 
Columbia Law School, ak472@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Law and Economics 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Avery W. Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary 
Negotiations, 105 YALE L. J. 1249 (1996). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/266 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
When Should an Offer Stick?
The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in
Preliminary Negotiations
Avery Katzt
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 1250
A. The Regulatory Role of Contract Formation Law ......... 1250
B. Promissory Estoppel and the Regulation of Reliance ...... 1253
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEM ............................... 1259
A. The Doctrinal Background ........................ 1259
B. Critique of the Traditional Approach ................. 1263
IT[. THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC PROBLEM ................... 1267
A. The Planning Problem ........................... 1267
B. The Incentive Problem ........................... 1270
C. The Policy Problem ............................. 1277
1. In Specific ................................. 1277
2. In General ................................. 1278
IV. EXTENDING THE REGULATORY ANALYSIS .................. 1281
A. Risk Aversion and Insurance ....................... 1282
B. Multiple Reliance Investments ...................... 1285
C. Two-Sided Uncertainty ........................... 1287
D. Asymmetric and Imperfect Information ................ 1289
E. Incentives to Reduce the Risk of Revocation ............ 1292
F. When Courts Can Police the Efficiency of Reliance ....... 1293
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Rich Friedman, Rick
Lempert, Scott Masten, Ginger Patterson, Bill Vukowich, Wendy Wiener, and workshop participants at the
University of Michigan, Georgetown University Law Center, the University of Pennsylvania, Wayne State
University, and the American Law and Economics Association for helpful comments and advice. I also
thank the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School for financial support and Andrew Niebler
for excellent research assistance.
1249
The Yale Law Journal
V. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO PARTICULAR CASES ............. 1295
A. Determinants of Bargaining Power-A Brief Recap ....... 1295
B. Relative Bargaining Power-A Selection of Examples ...... 1299
1. Franchise Relationships ....................... 1299
2. Lender-Borrower Disputes ...................... 1300
3. Broker-Customer Disputes ...................... 1301
4. Employer-Employee Disputes .................... 1301
C. Summary ..................................... 1302
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS .......................... 1302
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Regulatory Role of Contract Formation Law
The purpose of this Article is to examine the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, as it applies in the context of preliminary negotiations, from the
viewpoint of the economic theory of rational choice. This is part of a larger
project that attempts to understand better the regulatory role of contract
formation law generally. From a regulatory vantage point, estoppel and related
legal doctrines operate as economic regulations; they shape the bargaining
process by influencing the negotiators' incentives to make and to rely on
preliminary communications. As with all economic regulations, however, some
rules do better than others at promoting efficient exchange, and lawmakers
interested in maximizing social wealth must take this into account.
Because the regulatory perspective differs in important respects from more
traditional approaches to the subject, some general remarks are necessary to set
the stage. As I have argued elsewhere, the traditional literature on offer and
acceptance has taken the primary functional justification for legal doctrine in
the area to be coordination.' In this traditional view, contract formation rules
are primarily social conventions that serve to help contracting parties
coordinate their agreements, by ensuring that the parties attach the same
meaning to their objective manifestations and that their meaning will be
understood by third parties called upon to enforce the agreement. This is what
Lon Fuller called the "channeling function" of legal formalities.2
Courts and commentators who view contract formation law primarily as
a coordination device will spend most of their time on what I have elsewhere
1. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 216-22 (1990).
2. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941).
1250 [Vol. 105: 1249
When Should an Offer Stick?
called "convention maintenance."3 By this I mean activities such as describing
and promulgating the prevailing conventions; protecting the reliance
investments of those who operate according to them; providing newcomers
with incentives to learn them; and assisting everyone in applying them in
ambiguous and novel situations-all for the sake of averting
misunderstandings. The enterprise is primarily an interpretive one: Lawyers are
directed to search for the parties' reasonable or customary expectations, given
the factual circumstances of the case at hand, in order to determine what
inferences the parties are justified in making about each other's intentions. As
an illustration, consider the common law doctrine that, absent special
circumstances, an offeree's silence in the face of an offer will not constitute
assent.' The usual explanation for this rule is based on conventional
understanding: Ordinarily, silence does not warrant an inference of consent,
since there are too many other reasons to remain silent.5
Within this perspective, which I will call the "coordination" or
"interpretive" approach, legal analysis proceeds from the bottom up. Because
the proper conventions are taken as established and as embodied in the parties'
ordinary expectations, lawmaking authority is decentralized; it flows from the
parties and the community from which they come to lawyers and judicial
officials. Such an arrangement makes sense if parties' expectations are largely
independent of legal practices-for instance, if expectations are based on social
custom and are enforced by nonlegal sanctions such as reputation that the
parties regard as more important than what the courts can do to them. If so,
law must defer to the larger society if private individuals are not constantly to
be disappointed in their endeavors. Such an approach will be familiar to
students of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which defers
throughout to commercial practice and usage.
If private individuals can follow the law and adapt their expectations to it,
however, an interpretive approach cannot tell us which legal rule is best.
3. Katz, supra note 1, at 222.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
In exceptional circumstances, however, such an inference is justified, as when there has been a course of
dealing that leads the offeror to expect a response. Id. § 69(l)(c); see also I ARTHUR L. CORBIN & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.21, at 414 (rev. ed. 1993) ("[The exceptions to the rule] are all
cases in which the conduct of the party denying a contract has been such as to lead the other reasonably
to believe that silence, without communication, would be sufficient.").
5. See, e.g., I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 234 (1990) ("[Ain offeree's
silence in the face of an offer to sell goods is not ordinarily an acceptance, because the offeror has no
reason to believe from the offeree's silence that the offeree promises to buy."); I SAMUEL WILLISTON &
WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 91, at 319-21 (3d ed. 1957) ("Generally
speaking, an offeree need make no reply to offers, and his silence and inaction cannot be construed as an
assent to the offer .... ).
6. For general discussions of Article 2's deference to commercial custom, see Richard Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Zipporah
B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465,
492-541 (1987).
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Different conventions for interpreting the parties' external manifestations are
possible, and the mere requirement that law accord with expectation does not
justify any legal rule in particular. Attempting to ground law in social
conventions under such circumstances, therefore, is ultimately circular. This
does not mean that deferring to the expectations of the regulated community
is an incoherent idea, for in any particular social or historical context, the
content of these expectations may be quite clear. But the justification for
keeping to the prevailing conventions cannot in the end lie in the protection of
expectations. As Justice Holmes famously remarked: "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. '7 The real long-run argument for perpetuating an established
convention is that there are social costs incurred in switching from one
convention to another, and the costs are not worth bearing. This is why it is
sometimes more important to have the law settled, and less so to have it settled
correctly.
Often, however, getting the law settled correctly is important, since the
choice among conventions can affect both allocative efficiency and
distributional equity. By attaching consequences to the potential acts and
omissions individual bargainers might choose in a negotiation, the rules of
contract formation influence the parties' incentives to behave strategically: to
bluff, delay, make counteroffers, rely, and the like. The legal convention in
force will accordingly influence which contracts get formed and the terms on
which they get formed, and this is a matter of both private and social
concern.
8
The traditional dominance of the interpretive approach has meant the
relative neglect of such policy considerations. In order to take account of them
properly, an alternative approach is necessary-one that emphasizes how the
law of contract formation works to regulate behavior in negotiation. To
illustrate the difference, consider how the rule governing silent acceptance
looks from a regulatory perspective. Since responding to offers is costly, the
common law rule requiring an affirmative response raises the expense of
forming an agreement. A negative-option rule requiring the recipient to
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
8. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE W. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts] (advocating penalty default rules of interpretation to force disclosure of information during
bargaining); Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,
100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (arguing that strategic incentives might deter disclosure even under regime of
penalty default rules); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (analyzing efficiency effects of default rules in light of
transaction costs and strategic bargaining); Katz, supra note 1, at 230-32 (noting contract formation rules'
effect on structure and sequence of bargaining); Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the
Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J. ECON. 518 (1990) (analyzing duty to read); Steven Shavell, Acquisition
and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECoN. 20 (1994) (analyzing duty to disclose).
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respond in order to avoid entering a contract, conversely, would make it more
costly to reject offers and would increase the number of exchanges. If the
chance of an acceptance were high enough, the negative-option rule would
economize on the costs of sending communications, and would hence be a
more efficient convention. 9
From the regulatory perspective, the direction of analysis is top-down
rather than bottom-up. The central question is not which legal rule is consistent
with the parties' expectations, but what expectations the parties should be
encouraged to have in the first place. A regulatory approach to contract
formation is inappropriate if parties do not or will not respond to legal
sanctions. But when new contract formation rules are introduced, when old
ones are overhauled, or when ambiguous ones are clarified, regulatory issues
are unavoidable. In such circumstances, any decision will generate new
expectational conventions, not all of which have equal social value.
Furthermore, taking a regulatory perspective is especially important for
private individuals, who often have the power to choose which conventions to
use even when the state does not. In our common law system, the majority of
contract formation rules are default rules rather than mandatory ones. This fact
is sometimes expressed in the maxim that the offeror is "master of the
offer"-that is, the offeror, by specifying what is to count as a proper
acceptance, may propose changes in the rules of offer and acceptance as well
as in the parties' substantive obligations.' A similar power is explicitly
granted to parties to contracts governed by the UCC." For contracting parties
to use this regulatory power effectively, however, they must understand the
incentives they create for themselves in doing so.
B. Promissory Estoppel and the Regulation of Reliance
A regulatory perspective is useful in analyzing many of the rules of
contract formation, but one doctrine it particularly helps illuminate is
9. There would also be distributional consequences, since construing silence as acceptance allows the
offeror, by imposing the cost of a rejection on the offeree, to obtain a larger share of any gains from trade.
For a more complete analysis, see Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange:
When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
77 (1993).
10. The offeror is described as "the master of the offer" in the sense that, since by the
offer the offeror confers on the offeree the power of acceptance, the offeror has
control over the extent of that power and over how it may be exercised. The bargain
theory of consideration supports this conclusion.... What the offeror receives by
way of acceptance of the offer must therefore be what the offeror sought in making
the offer.
I FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.12, at 221-22.
11. With certain limited exceptions, the parties are free to contract around the default rules the Code
supplies. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994). As for sales, "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement .... Id. § 2-204(1).
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promissory estoppel. The classic statement of this principle is found in section
90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.' 2
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is commonly explained as promoting
the same purposes as the tort of misrepresentation: punishing or deterring those
who mislead others to their detriment and compensating those who are
misled.' 3 But these purposes, and the black letter definition of section 90
itself, can be read from either an interpretive or a regulatory perspective. From
the interpretive perspective, reliance is reasonable if it is customarily expected
under the circumstances, and justice requires compensation for those who
suffer loss when relying on the ordinary meaning of the defendant's words and
actions. From the regulatory perspective, in contrast, justice encompasses social
welfare, and reliance is reasonable when its expected benefits exceed its
expected costs-as in Learned Hand's celebrated formula for determining
negligence liability in tort.
14
Like all interpretive arguments, the conventional approach to promissory
estoppel becomes circular if individual expectations can adjust to the legal
regime. A policy of protecting reliance in any given set of circumstances will
make it safer to rely in those circumstances, and this will increase the extent
to which rationally self-interested promisees will rely. As a result, it will
appear more usual to rely. Deferring to conventional expectations will then
require protecting this reliance-consistent with the established policy.
Conversely, under a rule that one relies at one's peril, reliance will be costlier
and less frequent and will come to be perceived as less usual and less
reasonable. And once it is less reasonable to rely, a rule that one relies at one's
peril comports with social convention.
A specific application helps to focus the discussion. In recent years, one
of the more controversial uses of promissory estoppel has come in
precontractual negotiations. Individuals and companies doing business in a
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 90(l).
13. See, e.g., 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.19, at 146 ("What is the justification for this
alternative ground of recovery? The possibility of an answer founded on principles of tort law is
inescapable .... ); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 88 (1974) ("We are fast approaching the
point where.., any detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance on a defendant's assurances
must be recompensed. When that point is reached, there is really no longer any viable distinction between
liability in contract and liability in tort:' (footnote omitted)); see also P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 771-75 (1979) (relating case law of negligent misrepresentation to development
of contractual reliance-based liability).
14. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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variety of industries have found themselves bound by informal statements
made in the course of initiating a commercial relationship. In one line of cases,
courts have held franchisors and their agents liable for encouraging franchise
applicants to spend substantial resources in preparation for a franchise, even
though their applications were formally still under consideration. 5 In
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, for instance, the plaintiffs were induced to raise
$18,000, to sell their bakery business, to buy and operate a small grocery store
in a neighboring town and then to sell it at the height of the sales season, to
purchase a building site for the proposed franchise, and to rent a residence in
the town in which the franchise was to be located. 6 Though the franchisor
never offered the applicant a contract, the court found a basis for liability in
the franchisor's representations that the application was likely to be granted
and that the preparations were necessary for a successful franchise.
7
In a second line of cases, the defendants made offers of at-will
employment to individual workers who then quit their previous jobs or turned
down other employment, though they had neither accepted the offers nor
notified the defendants that they planned to accept. When the plaintiffs tried
later to accept, they were told that their services were no longer needed. The
courts found the defendants liable for the plaintiffs' loss in reliance. 8 And
in a third line of cases, subcontractors competing for parts of a construction
project submitted bids to general contractors, who then used the
subcontractors' proposals in preparing their own bids for the primary contract.
Courts bound the subcontractors to their initial bids on the theory that the
general contractors' reliance on those bids made them binding.' 9
The decisions in these cases differed in their precise doctrinal holdings. In
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, for instance, the franchisors' statements were held
to be promises enforceable under section 90, though there was never any
explicit offer on the table.2" In the employment cases, the employers' offers
were effectively held to be terminable only for cause, though by their formal
terms they proposed relationships that were terminable at will.2' And in
15. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965); Goodman v. Dicker,
169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
16. See 133 N.W.2d at 268-72.
17. See id. at 274-75.
18. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (construction worker as
plaintiff); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (pharmacist as plaintiff).
19. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 761 (Cal. 1958); Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B.
& J. Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080, 1091 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that subcontractor was bound under theory
of promissory estoppel unless bid clearly not final); Hoel-Steffen Constr. Co. v. United States, 684 F.2d
843, 848 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("[A] subcontractor's quotation to a general contractor can form the basis of an
enforceable commitment between the parties even prior to formal acceptance by the contractor .... ); Air
Conditioning Co. v. Richards Constr. Co.-Kaneohe Bay Project, 200 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 (D. Haw.
1961), aff'd, 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963) (subcontractor bound by his bid unless it expressly or impliedly
provides for revocation).
20, See Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 273-74.
21. See, e.g., Grouse, 306 NAV.2d at 116.
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Drennan v. Star Paving Co., the subcontractor's bid was deemed irrevocable
though there was never any explicit promise not to revoke.2 Nonetheless, the
underlying functional problem is the same in all three lines of cases. In all
three contexts, courts held parties bound by communications traditionally
thought to be nonbinding-whether promises, factual statements, predictions,
requests, or formal offers-because those communications were relied upon.
The plaintiffs' reliance was protected because it appeared both reasonable for
them to rely and reasonable to expect them to do so. And from the regulatory
perspective, both the plaintiffs and defendants needed to be given appropriate
incentives to behave efficiently: the defendants with regard to their statements,
and the plaintiffs with regard to their decisions to rely.
Since I am more interested in this Article in underlying incentive problems
than in the details of legal doctrine, I will for the most part disregard the
aforementioned doctrinal distinctions. I will focus instead on the construction
cases and the particular rules they have generated, in part because these cases
more clearly address the economic problem that I want to discuss and in part
to contrast the regulatory approach I advocate with two well-known judicial
opinions that reflect the traditional interpretive perspective. Much of my
analysis, however, will carry over to the analogous doctrines applied in the
employment and franchise cases; the factual settings of those other cases may
even better fit the functional analysis I will offer23
To foreshadow my main conclusions, it turns out that the efficiency of
promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations depends in large part on which
22. See Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759.
23. The construction cases do present two special problems that could further complicate matters. First,
in those cases, the offeree's reliance took the form not of making direct expenditures, but of incurring
contractual obligations to a third party. This should not in principle make any difference for an efficiency
analysis, so long as the amounts payable to the third party under the side contract, or the damages due in
the event of breach, fairly represent the third party's costs. If, however, the third party earns more or less
than a normal economic profit under the side contract, then changing the rules governing the primary
contract could influence the distribution of economic rents between the offeree and the third party. In this
case, what is efficient for the offeror and offeree, considered as a pair, may not be efficient for society as
a whole. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
388 (1987) (setting liquidated damages above actual damages can benefit parties to contract by excluding
potential competitive entrants); Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses:
An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 280 (1992) (showing that supracompensatory
damages can benefit contracting parties by redistributing economic rents away from potential third parties);
Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust
Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993) (applying Aghion-Bolton model to antitrust policy); Kathryn E. Spier
& Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry
Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 180 (1995) (showing that even when
renegotiation is possible ex post, incentive still exists for contracting parties to set supracompensatory
damages). Second, in the construction cases, the offeror's bid comes as the result of a competitive auction,
and the auction process itself may have consequences for efficiency. In particular, the procedure of
competitive bidding increases the chances that the winning bidder has made a mistake-the so-called
"1winner's curse." Parties to an auction have various options for dealing with this problem, but a
consideration of these possibilities would needlessly complicate this Article. In the succeeding analysis, I
ignore any special issues posed by auction theory. For a survey of such issues, see Paul Milgrom, Auctions
and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1989).
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party holds the bulk of the bargaining power ex post. If the original offeror
holds the bargaining power, then the modem doctrine that holds her to her
offer is likely to provide the more efficient rule, other things being equal. If,
on the other hand, it is the offeree who holds the bargaining power, then it is
more efficient to make him bear his own reliance costs, as the traditional
common law rule did.24 The reasoning underlying this conclusion is
straightforward. Economic efficiency requires that the benefits of reliance and
the risk that it will be wasted be balanced against each other at the margin.
The level of reliance that is privately profitable for the parties will coincide
with the socially optimal level under two conditions: The person who controls
the reliance must enjoy its marginal benefits, and he or she must also pay the
costs when it is wasted. Since in preliminary negotiations both parties control
the reliance and the party with the ex post bargaining power gets the gains, it
is that party who should also bear the costs.
Two caveats to this argument are appropriate at the outset. First, in this
Article, I will be talking about legal rules on the assumption that they actually
govern the parties' negotiations and will not address the interaction between
default rules chosen by the state or private associations, on the one hand, and
rules actually selected by individual contracting parties, on the other. Such an
omission may appear misguided to readers who are used to thinking of the
problem from the viewpoint of the judiciary and who also think it is easy for
private parties to contract around the law. But for the purposes of my analysis,
it does not matter whether it is courts, legislatures, or individual contracting
parties who set the rules of contract formation. The interaction between default
rules and private bargaining is critical from an interpretive perspective because,
under that perspective, the central tasks are identifying the default rule and
figuring out whether the parties have elected to vary it in the specific
circumstances at hand. From a regulatory perspective, however, who sets the
rules comes down to a question of comparative institutional competence,
turning on the relative transaction costs faced by the various possible
lawmakers. If costs of private negotiation are relatively high, then courts or
legislatures are in the better position to select a contract formation rule to
promote efficient exchange. Conversely, if private transaction costs are
relatively low, public lawmakers can simply set a clear default rule-it may
not matter which one-and let private parties negotiate their way around it if
they wish.
I do not discuss in this Article which of these situations might hold and
take no stand on who might be the most appropriate audience for the
succeeding analysis. My own suspicion is that the regulatory approach to
24. Except when referring to individual litigants in actual cases, I will use female pronouns to refer
to offerors (such as subcontractors and franchisors) and male pronouns to refer to offerees (such as general
contractors and potential franchisees).
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contract formation will be more useful to private individuals designing their
own arrangements than it will be to courts or legislatures, if only because the
former are likely to know more of the specific facts that determine which rule
is most efficient in their situation. But whoever sets the final rules of
negotiation needs to know the consequences of doing so. It may be possible
under current law for contracting parties to avoid the constraints of promissory
estoppel by explicitly reserving the right to revoke and by conspicuously
disclaiming liability for preliminary communications, just as it was possible
with the proper formalities to contract into reliance liability under the
traditional common law. But in order for contracting parties to know whether
they should do this, they first need to know what will happen if they try.
Similarly, a court or legislature setting a default rule needs to know how the
rule would work when actually in force, both to determine what rule private
individuals would most prefer and to predict whether private parties would
contract around a different default rule in favor of their own individual
arrangements. The analysis below is intended to address these sorts of
questions.
My second caveat concerns the normative underpinnings of the analysis.
This Article adopts economic efficiency as its primary criterion for evaluating
legal rules. It does not consider other policy goals, such as how the rule of
promissory estoppel might affect the distribution of wealth among the parties
to the transaction. Justifying the efficiency criterion in the contractual setting
is beyond the scope of this paper, and the usual admonitions will apply.2 It
is worth noting, however, that so long as the transaction in question is an
arm's-length one, the parties have the option not to enter into it, and they
know the risks and legal consequences, there are no obvious distributional
consequences from any change in the legal rules.26 As a general matter, the
surplus from exchange tends to be divided among contracting parties in
proportion to their relative eagerness to enter into the bargain. Any efficiency
gains or losses resulting from a change in regime, accordingly, will be shared
by all.27
In the succeeding parts of this Article, I spell out my overall argument in
more detail. Part HI presents the legal background in the construction bid
25. For more general discussions of the efficiency criterion, see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS AND THE LAW 95-132 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1983);
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). More specifically, Kaplow
and Shavell argue that even if distributional equity is an important social objective, it is more effectively
promoted by using direct public instruments such as tax and transfer payments than by adjusting the rules
of private law. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
26. The doctrine of silence as acceptance, discussed in Katz, supra note 9, is an exception to this
statement because the doctrine influences the cost of declining an exchange.
27. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-
Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 369-72 (1991) (demonstrating convergence of efficiency and
distributional goals).
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setting-the two most prominent common law cases and the relevant rules of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts-and uses this background to expose
the limitations of the interpretive approach described in Section I.A. Part EIl
outlines the basic economic problem that underlies the legal one-balancing
the benefits of early reliance against the costs of wasted reliance-and presents
a simple bargaining model that allows one to evaluate the doctrine of
promissory estoppel on efficiency grounds. The main conclusion of this model
is that the party with the bulk of the bargaining power ex post is in the best
position to ensure that reliance occurs at the socially optimal time. Part IV
discusses a number of variations on the basic model and comments on how
these might be compared and integrated with related work in the literature. It
concludes that the basic intuition of the simple model is still generally valid
notwithstanding these complications. Part V illustrates the lessons of the model
by applying them to a representative set of actual and hypothetical cases.
Finally, Part VI summarizes the argument and draws some tentative
conclusions.
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
A. The Doctrinal Background
Under the traditional common law rule, an offer was revocable any time
before acceptance. An extreme illustration is Petterson v. Pattberg,28 in which
the defendant, who had promised to accept a cash payoff of a mortgage held
on the plaintiff's realty, informed the plaintiff, while he stood on the
defendant's doorstep ready to tender the cash in his pocket, that the mortgage
had instead been sold to a third party. The court found an effective
revocation.29
This result was traditionally said to be required by the doctrine of
consideration: Until he accepted the offer, the offeree had given nothing in
exchange to warrant enforcement of a contract. Furthermore, allowing the
offeree an opportunity to choose whether to accept an offer without binding
him in return would give him a free opportunity to speculate at the offeror's
expense. Thus, while it was always possible to sell a binding option for value,
without consideration even an explicit promise to hold an offer open-the so-
called "firm offer"-was unenforceable, just as any executory gift promise
would have been.3
This doctrinal rule was always vulnerable to the criticism that it was out
of touch with commercial reality. This is because in a business context,
28. 161 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1928).
29. Id. at 430.
30. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.23.
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promises to hold offers open are not reasonably understood as gifts; rather,
offerors make them in the hope of getting something in return. For instance,
an offeror might want to commit to a firm offer as an inducement to the
offeree to go to the trouble of considering the proposal or to begin preparing
to perform-especially if the risk of speculation over price fluctuations is
insubstantial. In theory, this inducement could count as consideration, but
attempting to persuade a court that it was in fact bargained for would be costly
and risky. As a result, courts and commercial lawyers over the years turned to
a variety of formal devices in order to make such offers enforceable. Until the
abolition of the seal, for instance, it was possible to create a binding option by
promising under seal not to revoke. In many jurisdictions, a firm offer can be
supported by nominal consideration-the proverbial peppercorn or one
cent-or by a formal recital of consideration.3' And with the adoption of
Article 2 of the UCC, it became possible in sales transactions for merchants
to create an option binding for up to three months simply by putting it in the
form of a signed writing.3"
After the promulgation of the Restatement of Contracts, however, the new
doctrine of promissory estoppel offered an alternative approach. There had
always been courts that viewed detrimental reliance as sufficient consideration
to support contractual liability.33 With the ascendancy of the classical bargain
theory of consideration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
judges began drawing on the equitable doctrine of estoppel to enforce relied-on
promises that, for whatever reasons, could not pass the classical theory's
test.' While the drafters of the Restatement adopted the bargain theory in
their definition of consideration,35 they incorporated the competing arguments
in equitable form in section 90.36 In the decades since, this section has come
to be regarded as the Restatement's most influential innovation; it has provided
a basis for reliance-based recovery in countless situations where the traditional
formal requirements for enforcement were lacking.37 Once promissory
estoppel became established as black letter doctrine, offerees could argue that
their reliance on an offer could make it irrevocable---even if none of the
traditional formal devices were used. The theory was that an offer could carry
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 87 and cases cited therein.
32. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1994).
33. See ATIYAH, supra note 13, at 776; see also Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464, 465 (Md. 1888)
(holding nephew's voyage to Europe, following uncle's promise to help defray expenses, sufficient
consideration to enforce promise).
34. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898) (holding that granddaughter's
reliance in giving up job estopped executor from raising lack of consideration as defense against
grandfather's promissory note).
35. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
36. Id. § 90.
37. For brief discussions of the historical evolution of promissory estoppel, see ATIYAH, supra note
13, at 771-78; 1 FARNSWORrH, supra note 5, § 2.19; GILMORE, supra note 13, at 63-65.
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with it an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke, and that it would be unjust
not to enforce this promise once the promisee had relied.
The problem with this argument, though, was in making out all the
necessary elements of an estoppel claim. Absent an explicit promise not to
revoke, how could one reasonably be inferred from the circumstances of
negotiation? And even if the offeror did make an explicit statement that the
offer was firm, how could it be reasonable for the offeree to rely on that
statement without providing the requested consideration in the form of an
acceptance? Didn't such an offeree voluntarily assume the risk of wasted
reliance?
These questions were raised in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,3 one
of Judge Hand's most celebrated opinions and a warhorse of the casebooks. In
this case, Gimbel Brothers, a seller of linoleum flooring, sent offers to several
general contractors who were bidding to construct a building for the
Pennsylvania Department of Highways. Due to an error in calculation,
however, Gimbel's agent had underestimated the amount of linoleum required
by about one-half. When Gimbel discovered its mistake a few days later, it
telegraphed a correction to all the offerees. Unfortunately, the correction
reached Baird's office only after it had submitted its general bid, which was
based in part on Gimbel's. When Baird was awarded the primary contract,
Gimbel refused to honor its offer.39
Initially, Baird tried to argue that by using Gimbel's bid as the basis for
its own general bid, it had accepted and entered into a mutually binding
bilateral contract, albeit one contingent on its being awarded the primary
contract. The language of Gimbel's bid, however, made this interpretation a
difficult one.40 Furthermore, Baird had never notified Gimbel of any
acceptance, nor had it taken any publicly observable action that would have
enabled Gimbel to prove an acceptance had it been the one seeking to enforce
the bargain. As a result, Baird fell back on Restatement section 90.
Judge Hand, however, was unsympathetic to the estoppel argument. In his
view, it was unreasonable to suppose that Gimbel meant to bind itself to
perform while leaving Baird free to seek a better bargain elsewhere. Since
Baird had never accepted, Hand concluded, Gimbel's offer had never ripened
into the promise that was a necessary element for a section 90 claim:
[A]n offer for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a
consideration has been received, either a counter-promise or whatever
else is stipulated. To extend it would be to hold the offeror regardless
of the stipulated condition of his offer. In the case at bar the
38. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
39. Id. at 345.
40. The offer concluded with the words: "'[We] are offering these prices for reasonable... prompt
acceptance after the general contract has been awarded."' Id.
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defendant offered to deliver the linoleum in exchange for the
plaintiff's acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter of
indifference to it. That offer could become a promise to deliver only
when the equivalent was received; that is, when the plaintiff promised
to take and pay for it. There is no room in such a situation for the
doctrine of "promissory estoppel.'
Hand's opinion in Baird remained the leading authority on this issue for
a quarter century. In 1958, however, the California Supreme Court heard the
case of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 42 Star had telephoned in the low offer for
pavement work on a school construction project on which Drennan was
bidding to be primary contractor. Drennan used Star's bid in computing his
own, and included Star's name on the list of subcontractors required by the
school district's rules. Drennan won the bidding and was awarded the contract,
but when he stopped by Star's office the next day, he was informed that Star's
bid was mistaken and that Star could not do the paving at the price it had
offered.
The court might easily have distinguished Drennan from Baird on the
facts. Drennan's use of Star's bid could have been interpreted as an acceptance
contingent on Drennan's winning the primary contract. There was nothing in
the language of either bid to preclude this, and Drennan had publicly listed
Star as one of its subcontractors. Alternatively, since Star did not inform
Drennan of the mistake until after Drennan arrived at Star's office to announce
that they had won the bidding, the court could have found that Drennan had
accepted in time and that Star's revocation was too late. Or, the facts might
have supported the conclusion that Star had not tried to revoke at all, but
instead had been merely asking for a modification. The court, however, in a
celebrated opinion by Justice Roger Traynor, did none of these. Instead, it
based its holding on the estoppel theory Judge Hand had rejected twenty-five
years earlier:
Had defendant's bid expressly stated or clearly implied that it was
revocable at any time before acceptance we would treat it accordingly.
It was silent on revocation, however, and we must therefore determine
whether there are conditions to the right of revocation imposed by law
or reasonably inferable in fact. ...
When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own bid,
he bound himself [to the school system] to perform in reliance on
defendant's terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of
its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether it
would be used or not .... Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's
reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is
41. Id. at 346.
42. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
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bound by his own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at least
an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has
been awarded to him.
43
Traynor's analysis in Drennan won out over Hand's analysis in Baird in
subsequent contractor-subcontractor cases. 44 More importantly, however, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts subsequently adopted and
extended the logic of Drennan. Restatement (Second) section 87(2) today
provides that "[a]n offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before
acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an
option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. 45 Under sections
87(2) and 90, courts have applied promissory estoppel over the succeeding
years to offers of employment,4 6 offers to pay commissions to sales
brokers, 47 and even to cases such as Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,48 in which
no offer had been made at all.
As a result of these developments, the traditional rule of interpretation has
been reversed. Where firm offers were once entirely unenforceable, they are
now both enforceable and presumed so by default-so long as offerees rely.
Furthermore, the promisor's obligation is unilateral, not mutual; courts
generally have declined to construe the offeree's reliance as either an
acceptance or a promise to accept.49 As a result, the interpretation Judge
Hand thought unreasonable-that offerors intend to provide offerees with a
free option when they make offers-has become the standard legal convention.
B. Critique of the Traditional Approach
This doctrinal shift was controversial because using promissory estoppel
in the precontractual setting conflicted with a set of longstanding conventions
for contract formation-the formal rules of offer and acceptance. In Drennan
and the employment cases, the offerees had never formally accepted the offers
made to them, so binding the offeror contravened the convention that an offer
43. Id. at 759-60.
44. See cases cited supra nofe 19; see also Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688
P.2d 576 (Alaska 1984) (adopting rule of Drennan over that of Baird as better law); Ferrer v. Taft
Structurals, 587 P.2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (adopting rule of Drennan).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 87(2).
46. See cases cited supra note 18.
47. See, e.g., Marchiondo v. Scheck, 432 P.2d 405, 407-08 (N.M. 1967) (basing decision on
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 since offer was for unilateral contract).
48. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
49. For example, in the subsequent case of Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C.v. Holder, Inc..
456 P.2d 975. 978 (Cal. 1969). Chief Justice Traynor rejected the argument that listing the subcontractor
in a general bid created an analogous subsidiary promise on the part of the general contractor not to reject
the subcontractor's bid. See also Holman Erection Co. v. Orville E. Madsen & Sons, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 693
(Minn. 1983) (reaching similar result).
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remains revocable until accepted. In the franchise cases, there was not even
any offer to be accepted. As a result, courts easily concluded, as Hand had in
Baird, that it was the defendants in these cases who deserved protection, not
the plaintiffs. The defendants, after all, had based their expectations on
standard formal conventions of offer and acceptance. Since the plaintiffs
should have understood that they were relying at their peril, courts found no
injustice in failing to enforce the offers made to them.5
Of course, when the doctrine of promissory estoppel was first introduced,
it undermined the equally well-settled convention that contracts were not
enforceable without consideration. The original advocates of promissory
estoppel, however, had taken the position that mere convention should not be
regarded as decisive; in appropriate circumstances, reliance justified relief from
the harshness of the consideration doctrine. Traynor and the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) were arguing that reliance should justify relief from other
formal conventions of contract formation as well.
Partisans of Hand's more traditional approach could reply, however, that
applying promissory estoppel within the context of offer and acceptance
doctrine was a different matter from using it to substitute for consideration.
Between commercial parties, the consideration requirement served no important
coordinating function. Instead, it operated primarily as a substantive limitation
on arm's-length bargains5' and, as such, had been under attack in the
commercial setting since the days of Lord Mansfield. 2 The doctrines of offer
and acceptance, in contrast, posed no substantive barriers to the protection of
reliance; parties who wished to rely could protect themselves, cheaply and
easily, by following established procedure. The primary effect of estoppel in
the precontractual setting was to grant such protection to offerees without
requiring them to provide anything in return.
In my terminology, however, both sides of this debate argue from the
perspective of convention maintenance. Hand and other critics of expanding
promissory estoppel were ultimately arguing that enforcing unaccepted offers
disrupts the prevailing formal conventions.53 Traynor and the other advocates
of liberal estoppel were ultimately arguing that the elegance of the formal rules
of offer and acceptance does not matter if they are not really the conventions
that people understand to be in force, or if other more compelling
50. If the reliance benefited the promisor, of course, the promisee might have a separate claim in
restitution (e.g., if the promisee relied by disclosing valuable ideas). For a discussion of restitution cases
in the precontractual setting, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. RIv. 217, 229-33 (1987).
51. The possibility of sealed agreement meant that the parties, with some trouble, could contrive to
make a gift promise enforceable, but with the decline of the seal this ceased to be a practical alternative
in most jurisdictions.
52. See, e.g., Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038 (K.B. 1765) (suggesting in dictum that
written promises between merchants should require no consideration).
53. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand, J.) ("[A]n
offer for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a consideration has been received .... ).
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considerations lead people to ignore them. 4 Novices in business, such as the
franchise applicants in Hoffrnan, may not know the formal legal doctrines, and
more experienced parties, such as the general contractor in Drennan, may view
legal doctrine as subordinate to prevailing social norms or business exigencies.
For both kinds of parties, these norms and exigencies may constitute the real
conventions in force. In this view, because offerors know about and knowingly
benefit from offerees' reliance on such social and business understandings, it
would be unfair to allow one party to evade the obligations of such
understandings while it reaps the benefits of the other's compliance. Rather
than trying to preserve the elegant and official conventions that parties do not
really use, the law should try to reflect the messy but realistic conventions that
the parties do actually follow.
Both Hand's and Traynor's arguments take conventions as given and try
not to influence but to accommodate them. Individuals who interact regularly
within the regime of contract law, however, such as construction contractors
and subcontractors, will ordinarily have both the ability and the incentive to
adjust their expectations to the legal rules in force. They can protect
themselves against unfair surprise whatever the legal rule. Under a regime that
follows Baird rather than Drennan, contractors can still choose to rely on
subcontractors' bids without accepting. They will only do so, however, to the
extent that the benefits of uncovered reliance outweigh the risk of
disappointment; and the costs of wasted reliance will be allocated through the
price mechanism. Contractors can, for instance, easily protect themselves
against revoking subcontractors by including a margin of insurance in their
general bids. They will then do worse than average on jobs on which
subcontractors actually revoke but will make up for this with increased profits
on the occasions when the subcontractors come through. Furthermore, under
a rule granting subcontractors the right to revoke, subcontractors are willing
to make lower bids in the first place. Indeed, in a competitive bidding
environment, they are forced to do so because their expected cost of
performance is lower when they do not have to insure against the contractor's
lost reliance.5
The fact that the parties can adapt their behavior to the prevailing
convention does not, however, mean that the choice of convention is irrelevant,
and as lawmakers, we need to take account of the regulatory consequences of
choosing one conventional rule rather than another. The Restatement
(Second)'s rule raises the cost to subcontractors of both making and retracting
offers; this, in turn, tends to reduce the number of offers and affect the time
54. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (Traynor, J.) ("Though
defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether
it would be used or not.").
55. For a fuller explanation of the process of such price adjustments, see Craswell, supra note 27, at
366-68.
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at which they are made. The rule also gives the offeror stronger incentives to
avoid misrepresentations and to ensure that the calculations that go into her
offer are accurate. For the offeree, conversely, the modern rule encourages
greater reliance by lowering its cost.
A full regulatory analysis of the problem requires us to consider all these
factors. In the next part, however, I will focus on those issues having to do
with timing. Rather than ask whether the parties should enter into a binding
relationship, I will ask when they should do so. Or, as Karl Llewellyn posed
the question: When should an offer stick?56 This specific doctrinal problem
lies at the center of Baird, Drennan, and Restatement (Second) section 87(2);
and, as the next part shows, it turns out that the answer determines whether
reliance investments are made at the appropriate time. Part IV then relates the
conclusions of my basic analysis to previous work on the other regulatory
issues: incentives to perform, to take precautions against breach, to discover
and share information, and to allocate risks.
A final caveat is appropriate here. In most of the discussion below, I
abstract from issues of damages. There is some dispute, both in the case law
and among commentators, whether the proper remedy in estoppel cases is
measured by the promisee's lost reliance expenditures or by his lost
expectation.57 But since both expectation and reliance measures fully insure
the promisee against wasted reliance, both measures encourage the promisee
to act as though performance were certain.58 For our purposes, therefore, the
issue is secondary. In many cases, moreover, reliance and expectation damages
are approximately equal, since reliance is generally a good proxy for
expectation, especially when opportunity reliance is considered.5 9
56. K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48 YALE L.J. 779, 802
(1939).
57. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. III
(1991).
58. Expectation damages do this by guaranteeing promisees the returns from their reliance investments,
and reliance damages do this by guaranteeing a full refund if the returns are not achieved. Specifically, if
the benefits from reliance are represented as B, the costs as C, and the probability of a completed bargain
as p, it is socially desirable to invest in reliance if pB > C. Expectation damages guarantee the promisee
a return of B, inducing him to rely whenever B > C. Reliance damages compensate the promisee's
investment in the (1 - p) fraction of cases in which there is no performance, making his effective cost of
reliance equal to pC rather than C. He will rely if pB > pC, or equivalently, if B > C. Under either system,
damages are excessive if B > C > pB.
59. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REv.
1432, 1434-44 (1985); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 60 (1936).
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III. THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC PROBLEM
A. The Planning Problem
The legal controversies in the area of precontractual negotiations stem
from one basic fact: There are economic gains to negotiating contracts over an
extended period of time. A minority of transactions, mostly involving the
exchange of homogeneous goods, can be conducted in spot markets without
any loss in value, but ordinarily parties benefit from planning exchanges in
advance. One reason for this is that time and effort are needed to decide on the
bargain. The parties must determine whether an exchange is desirable at all,
what terms are best, and how they will split the cooperative surplus. Equally
important is the fact that advance planning increases the gains from trade by
allowing the parties to rely. In most exchanges, the parties have opportunities
to make investments that can make the bargain more valuable, and such
investments are cheaper and more productive when made in advance. For
instance, suppliers of goods with advance notice of an exchange can typically
lower their production costs by buying materials when the prices are low or
by doing work when business is slow. Last-minute production is more
expensive because it involves rush, leading to increased overtime pay, more
waste of materials, and the like.
Conversely, buyers can increase the utility of their purchases by investing
beforehand in complementary inputs such as specialized storage facilities, or
in such services as training workers to use the goods. If buyers are purchasing
for resale rather than immediate use, advance dealing also gives them more
time to find a better resale price. Furthermore, both buyers and sellers can rely
by giving up opportunities to make substitute deals, thus saving the potentially
significant cost of searching for and maintaining contact with alternative
contractual partners. All these investments are relationship- or transaction-
specific; the parties would not make them apart from the particular underlying
exchange. These factors represent, in the terminology of Professors Goetz and
Scott, the beneficial aspect of reliance. 0
Indeed, dealing in advance promotes beneficial reliance whether or not a
bargain is concluded, for, if there is to be no exchange, it will benefit the
parties to find this out early. So long as there is a possibility of an exchange,
it pays to hedge by making some transaction-specific investments, and ruling
out the possibility of exchange allows such expenditures to be saved. For
instance, suppose that performance will require the physical transportation of
goods. Waiting until the last moment to trade in spot markets may mean that
60. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261, 1267-70 (1980). Even the time and effort put into considering the merits of
a particular exchange may be a form of reliance, if the information gained cannot be applied to competing
offers.
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unsold goods have to be brought back and forth from the marketplace. If
shipping costs are high and the chances of not finding a buyer are significant,
it is better to negotiate before any goods are shipped.
On the other hand, early dealing has an obvious countervailing
disadvantage. Over time, the parties' attitudes toward an exchange may change.
New opportunities may arise, or they may discover new information relevant
to the bargain. For example, after a buyer and seller agree on a sale, a second
buyer with a more valuable use for the goods may come along. Alternatively,
the seller's production cost may increase unexpectedly, or the buyer may suffer
business reverses that render him unable to purchase. If such developments are
enough to make a previously desirable bargain undesirable, any transaction-
specific reliance investments will go to waste, and the parties will regret that
they contracted so early. The costs of regret are, in Goetz and Scott's
terminology, the detrimental aspect of reliance.6'
Economic efficiency in preliminary negotiations requires that the
advantages of beneficial reliance and the disadvantages of detrimental reliance
be balanced against each other at the margin. Deciding to enter into a contract
too early, when the level of uncertainty is high and the productive value of
reliance low, results in too much reliance. It leads to sinking costs at a time
when they are likely to be wasted. Contracting too late, on the other hand,
forgoes the benefits of early planning and preparation. So, because both the
productive value of reliance and the level of uncertainty change over time,
there exists in any given negotiation, and for any given transaction-specific
investment, a moment at which it is optimal to begin investing. We can
identify this moment by comparing the incremental value of waiting to see
what uncertainty will be resolved with the incremental cost of delaying an
otherwise productive investment. As time passes, the incremental cost of delay
will begin to exceed the incremental benefits of waiting. From the standpoint
of a planner concerned with maximizing social wealth, this is the moment
when the parties should be directed to rely.
To illustrate, consider a simple numerical example, depicted in Table 1. In
this example, a subcontractor and general contractor can contract for the
subcontractor's services at any time over a five-week period. For simplicity,
suppose that the only risk involved is that the subcontractor may be unable to
perform; her ability to do so turns on the successful completion of a previous
job at another site. If the subcontractor cannot perform, the general contractor
will have to abandon the overall project. The subcontractor's uncertainty,
however, is resolved over time. At the outset of the period, in Week 1, the
chance that she cannot perform is 20%. By Week 5, she will know for certain
whether or not she can perform. The uncertainty is resolved at a constant rate:
With each week that passes without bad news, the chance that the
61. See id. at 1267-69.
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subcontractor will be unable to perform falls by 5%. This declining uncertainty
is depicted in column (a) of the table, labeled "Chance of Breach."
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
START CHANCE OF DISCOUNTED POTENTIAL DISCOUNTED EXPECTED NET
WEEK BREACH LOST RELIANCE PROFITS PROFITS PROFITS
(a) x $60,000 (c) X (I - (a)) (d) - (b)
1 20% $12,000 $20,000 $16,000 $4000
2 15% $9000 $16,000 $13,600 $4600
3 10% $6000 $12,000 $10,800 $4800
4 5% $3000 $8000 $7600 $4600
5 0% $0 $4000 $4000 $4000
TABLE 1. Optimal Reliance
In order to begin preparations for the job, the general contractor must
spend $60,000 on labor and specially manufactured materials that will have to
be thrown out if the project is canceled.62 The risk of this happening
decreases the longer the contractor waits before starting work. Column (b)
shows the expected waste from lost reliance, which equals the $60,000 reliance
investment multiplied by the chance that the project will have to be canceled.
If, on the other hand, the subcontractor can perform, the project will yield a
return sufficient to repay the reliance investment, providing the general
contractor with an overall profit.
As explained above, however, the amount of profit to be earned depends
on how soon the contractor begins work. If the contractor begins in Week 1
and the job is successfully completed, there will be profits of $20,000; starting
in Week 2 means profits of only $16,000, and so on. The relationship between
the potential profits to be earned and the starting date is shown in column (c),
labeled "Potential Profits." Of course, the parties will earn these profits only
if the job is completed, so they must be discounted by the chance that the
subcontractor will be unable to perform. The discounted level of profits is
shown in column (d). In Week 1 it is $16,000 (equivalent to an 80% chance
of a $20,000 profit); in Week 2 it is $13,600 (equivalent to an 85% chance of
a $16,000 profit); and so on.63 Finally, column (e) shows the bottom
62. More realistically, the reliance will increase as the general contractor continues work, and will be
greater the later the subcontractor backs out. A given reliance investment, furthermore, may be more
expensive to make the longer it is delayed. The example ignores these possibilities for the sake of
simplicity, but the basic intuition would be the same if they were included.
63. I am assuming here that the parties are risk-neutral, so that this discount accurately reflects the risk
of nonperformance. Section IV.A extends the analysis to cover the case of risk aversion.
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line-expected net profits from the project, equal to the difference between
discounted profits and discounted lost reliance. For instance, the $4000
expected profit in Week 1 reflects the 80% chance of a $20,000 profit, minus
the 20% chance of a $60,000 loss.
Given the above assumptions, the optimal time to begin is Week 3, since
expected net profits are highest then-they are $4800, reflecting a 90% chance
of a $12,000 profit, less a 10% chance of a $60,000 loss. This is the optimal
time because it balances the incremental costs and benefits of waiting another
week. For each week of construction delay, expected lost reliance falls by 5%
of $60,000, or $3000. The discounted profits, conversely, fall only $2400
between Weeks 1 and 2 and $2800 between Weeks 2 and 3, so it is worth
waiting to see what happens. It is not worth waiting past Week 3, however,
since discounted profits fall $3200 between Weeks 3 and 4 and another $3600
between Weeks 4 and 5.
Nothing in this example, by the way, requires us to assume that there is
only one offeror and one offeree. It might well be optimal for an offeree to
rely simultaneously on offers from multiple offerors if he does not know which
one he ultimately will want to accept. The benefits from early reliance on the
successful offer might be sufficient to outweigh the costs of waste on the
unsuccessful ones. For the same reasons, it might be optimal for multiple
offerees to rely on a single offeror who can deal with only one of them. Of
course, for any individual party, the optimal length of time to delay reliance
will increase as the number of potential trading partners and the uncertainty
over who should contract with whom increase.
The problem becomes more complicated when an offeree can make
multiple reliance investments in response to the same offer. In general, it is not
optimal to make all such investments at the same instant, for they will differ
in size, productivity, salvage value, and availability of substitutes, and their
costs may change at different rates over time. Instead, each individual
investment will present its own trade-off between beneficial and detrimental
reliance. For reliance investments that yield large increases in profits when
made incrementally earlier or that are partially salvageable if the bargain is
canceled, the optimal moment for reliance is early. For investments that could
be delayed without much loss in productivity or that are highly transaction-
specific, the optimal moment for reliance is late.
B. The Incentive Problem
The foregoing analysis tells us which reliance decision would maximize
the expected gains from trade. Whether the parties actually choose to rely at
the optimal time, however, depends on the information and incentives provided
them by the legal regime. In the presence of uncertainty, parties faced with
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investment decisions generally find it profitable to take an intermediate
position-that is, to hedge. In the case of precontractual reliance, the privately
profitable hedge will coincide with the socially optimal hedge if the person
choosing the hedge enjoys the incremental gains of beneficial reliance and pays
the incremental costs of detrimental reliance. The legal regime, together with
the parties' relative bargaining strength and the information available to them,
will determine whether these conditions are met.
One obvious way for the legal system to promote optimal reliance is for
courts to examine the parties' reliance decisions directly and to condition
liability explicitly on the efficiency of those decisions. To some extent, the
doctrinal requirements that reliance be reasonable and that liability be limited
as justice requires already imply such an approach. Under the provisions of
Restatement (Second) sections 87(2) and 90(1), an offeree whose reliance
vastly exceeds the amount a court finds reasonable will not get full protection.
Instead, he will recover only his reasonable reliance expenditures and will have
to bear the costs of any excess on his own. Such a limitation will in theory
give him the incentive not to overrely. In order for this method of regulation
to work effectively, however, courts must be able to compare the potential
costs and benefits of reliance after the fact, and they must be willing to
associate this cost-benefit calculus with the Restatement (Second)'s standard
of reasonableness. It is questionable whether actual judges and juries can
perform this exercise in practice, except with the roughest approximation.
Given the difficulty of the task and given the courts' traditional focus on
convention maintenance, they are more likely to identify the reasonableness
standard with customary expectations than with efficiency.
6 4
This problem is analogous to a longstanding controversy over efficient
incentives in the economic analysis of tort law. Various commentators on tort,
most prominent among them Judge Richard Posner, have argued that a
negligence standard for liability provides potential tortfeasors and victims with
the best incentives to take proper precautions against accidents. The reasoning
is that of the famous Hand Formula. If potential tortfeasors are found negligent
when (and only when) their precautionary decisions fail a cost-benefit test,
they will internalize both the costs and the benefits of precaution and come to
an efficient decision on their own. This will induce them to meet their legal
duty of care. The victims, who will bear any residual costs of accidents, will
then face the correct social incentives when it comes to making a cost-benefit
65decision regarding their own defensive precautions. -
64. But see Richard Craswell, Offer Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming Feb. 1996) (suggesting that courts are often in position to evaluate whether reliance has been
efficient, and arguing that a variety of rules in contract formation law ought to be, and often are, applied
on this basis).
65. See RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9 (1983); Robert Cooter,
Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985); Richard
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). For a formal comparison of the abilities of
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An opposing group of commentators, however, including most prominently
Judge Guido Calabresi, have argued that courts are in a substantially poorer
position than the disputing parties to make cost-benefit decisions about optimal
care. The parties, after all, have more information and experience relevant to
their individual situations, allowing them to evaluate costs and benefits at the
time they act. They can also consider a wider variety of possible precautions
than courts can, including precautions that take the form of reductions in the
frequency or intensity of their activities. Given these advantages, and given the
greater administrative costs of conducting an inquiry into the parties'
negligence, strict liability is preferable to a negligence standard. Courts should
not try to perform their own cost-benefit analysis after the fact. Instead, they
would do better to identify and hold liable the party that is best able to make
and act on such an analysis in the first instance-the so-called "least-cost
avoider." Focusing on the least-cost avoider will direct the courts' limited
enforcement capacity where it is most effective; this will come closer to the
second-best outcome than will attempts to split incentives between the parties
under an inaccurate and administratively costly negligence standard.66
For purposes of promoting optimal reliance in preliminary negotiations, the
metaphor of the least-cost avoider is more useful than the algorithm of the
Hand Formula. It is much easier for a tribunal to identify which party was in
the better position to make the reliance decision than for the tribunal to make
that decision itself after a dispute has arisen. Reliance in commercial contexts,
after all, is highly specific to the individual transaction. The efficiency of
potential investments depends on the probability of a completed bargain at the
time an investment is made, but the tribunal can only assess this probability
in hindsight after substantial delay. Measuring the proper timing of reliance
after the fact is even more daunting, for it requires the court to determine not
just expected costs and benefits at the moment of reliance, but also how these
costs and benefits (and the probability of a bargain as well) changed over time
throughout the relevant period. The task is made more difficult because
reliance typically comes in intangible forms such as turning down substitute
opportunities for exchange. Such "opportunity reliance" is notoriously difficult
and costly to prove; this is why the reliance interest has often been protected
in practice by awarding not reliance damages, but the expectation or restitution
measure as a substitute.67
strict liability and negligence rules to reduce accident losses, see Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
66. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ.
1055, 1060-76 (1972).
67. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 59, at 60. For theoretical explanations of why expectation and
restitution are good proxies for reliance, see Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 1444-52: Avery Katz,
Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages": A Positive Economic
Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541 (1988).
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Accordingly, the subsequent analysis will follow Calabresi rather than
Posner and will assume that, except in extreme cases, the fact-finding tribunal
is not in a position to make a substantive determination regarding optimal
reliance. Instead, it must place the liability for lost reliance on one side or the
other, searching for the least-cost avoider. It turns out, however, that this
search will often be reasonably straightforward. Other things being equal, the
least-cost avoider is the party with the bargaining power ex post.68
Suppose, then, that the two parties have equally good information about
the costs and benefits of reliance and about the risk that the bargain will fail
to be executed. 69 Then a rule that binds the offeror to an option contract as
soon as she makes an offer, like that imposed by Drennan and the Restatement
(Second), makes reliance safe for the offeree. If the offer comes too early in
the process, however, what is safe for the offeree will be too safe from the
social point of view. The problem here is moral hazard, in which a person who
is insured against losses from an activity ignores the real social risks attached
to it. Because the prospect of a damage recovery insures the offeree against
some of the costs of detrimental reliance, he has less of an incentive to avoid
it. Under a rule of either expectation damages or reliance damages, the offeree
gets full insurance against the offeror's nonperformance. Accordingly, if he
gets any benefit at all from the productive value of reliance, he will have an
incentive to rely as soon as possible.
By the same token, however, liability for reliance damages imposes the
costs of wasted reliance on the offeror. She will therefore have an incentive to
control these reliance costs by delaying her offer. If she can capture the full
productive benefits of reliance, which she can accomplish if she has all the
bargaining power, she will have the appropriate incentive to weigh costs
against benefits. This position will induce her to wait to make an offer until
the very moment it is socially optimal to rely, leading to the desired outcome.
If the offeror cannot capture the full benefits of reliance, on the other hand, she
will weigh the wasted reliance too heavily from the social viewpoint, and her
incentive will be to wait too long before making an offer.
Conversely, a rule that leaves the offeror free to revoke places the costs
of wasted preparations on the offeree. The offeror will then have little
incentive to delay her offer or otherwise to restrain the offeree from relying.
If the offeree can capture the full productive benefits of reliance, he will be the
one with the correct incentive to weigh costs against benefits. This position
will lead him to rely at the optimal moment even without any legal protection.
If the offeree cannot capture all the productive benefits of reliance, however,
he will be overly cautious and will rely too late. One way that this situation
68. In Section IV.F, I will briefly discuss how the analysis would be altered in those situations where
courts can determine the level of efficient reliance ex post.
69. I discuss in Section IV.D how the analysis would change if this were not the case.
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can occur is if the offeror has all the bargaining power ex post; she can then
capture the value of reliance by raising the offer price after the offeree has
relied. For this reason, the offeree will have no incentive to rely at all, unless
he can bind the offeror to an agreement beforehand.
To illustrate, consider again the numerical example of Table 1 above.
Suppose the subcontractor has full information about all the figures in the table
and has all the bargaining power. For the sake of simplicity, one might
imagine that she is allowed to make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer, so that
by offering a contract price that just barely affords the contractor a profit on
the transaction, she can capture virtually all the gains from trade.70 In this
case, if the subcontractor waits until the last week to make her offer, after all
uncertainty is resolved, the price she can charge depends on whether and when
the contractor relied. If he has not relied prior to that point, she can charge him
up to $4000 over her cost-the entire profit from the transaction.1 If he was
foolish enough to rely in Week 1, however, she can charge him up to $64,000
over her cost. This represents the sum of his $60,000 reliance investment,
which successful completion of the project will return to him, and the $4000
profit he expects to make over and above that.72 This possibility exists
because reliance is a sunk cost for the contractor; once he has relied, he prefers
a losing contract that allows him to get back some of his expenditures to no
contract at all. Similarly, if he relied in Week 3, the subcontractor can charge
him up to $64,800 over cost. Reliance before the subcontractor is bound gives
her the power to expropriate the contractor's sunk investment. As a result, a
rational contractor without any bargaining power would refuse to rely at all,
since he cannot capture any of the incremental gains from early reliance, but
he bears all of the risk.
There is a simple way out of this predicament. A subcontractor with all the
bargaining power can offer a binding option in Week 3-by making an offer
that she knows a court would construe as binding-to do the work at a price
of slightly less than $12,000 over cost. The contractor will be willing to accept
70. Alternatively, the subcontractor will have the bargaining power if she is the only seller of her
particular service in the market, and the contractor is one of many potential buyers, all bidding against each
other. For a fuller discussion of the conditions giving rise to ex post bargaining power, see infra Section
V.A. The discussion in the text assumes that the contractor will accept a one-sided offer because a bare
profit is better than a loss or no profit at all. This assumption is a stylized one, of course; in reality, an
offeree may be so put off by an offer that does not give him what he regards as a fair share that he will
reject it, despite the fact that it would be in his immediate interest to accept. Just how much constitutes a
fair share, of course, will vary among offerees and is one of the key determinants of bargaining power. For
a discussion of how the parties' views of fairness influence the bargains they are willing to accept, see
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728 (1986).
71. Minus whatever slight amount of profit is necessary to induce the contractor to accept, which I
ignore for expositional simplicity. My colleague Steven Salop informs me that the technical term for this
quantity is a "smidge."
72. Again, minus a smidge. A contractor with no bargaining power would rather pay the subcontractor
$63,999 above cost than let the deal fall apart. If the deal falls apart, he loses his entire $60,000 reliance
investment, which is a sunk cost. If he agrees to the subcontractor's inflated price, he will lose only
$59,999.
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this offer, because it affords him a small profit in the event of performance and
insures him against lost reliance in the event of nonperformance. Once the
option is made binding, the contractor will want to rely immediately. He is
now fully insured, and with the subcontractor bound not to increase her price,
he can capture all the profits that come from early reliance. Indeed, he is
forced to rely immediately in order to avoid a loss, since if he waits a week,
his profits will not cover the costs of the subcontract. Under this arrangement,
the contractor breaks even, whether or not the subcontractor performs. For her
part, the subcontractor earns just under $12,000 if she is able to perform,
which occurs with 90% probability. She must pay out $60,000 in reliance
damages if she cannot, which occurs with 10% probability. Her expected profit
is then just under $4800, the total surplus from the transaction.73 Since this
is the maximum amount she can expect to earn (she can capture the expected
net profits in any of the five weeks by a similar strategy), her incentives are
socially optimal. She will want to bind herself just in time for optimal
reliance.74
Conversely, suppose it is the offeree rather than the offeror who has all the
bargaining power, so the offeror is unable to charge a price that exceeds her
own expected cost of performance. For ease of exposition, let us suppose
simply that the offeree can somehow commit to rejecting any offer that
exceeds the offeror's cost. In this case, the offeree will have the incentive to
rely optimally even if the offeror is not bound by her offer.
To illustrate, consider once again the example in Table 1, assuming that
the contractor has all the bargaining power and that the subcontractor can
73. An alternative, though less simple, way to provide an equivalent result is for the subcontractor to
make a binding offer in which she disclaims liability for lost reliance, but promises to do the work for only
$5333.33 over cost in the event that she is available to perform. If this option is enforceable, it will yield
the contractor a profit of $12,000 less $5333.33, or $6666.67, with 90% probability-enough to cover the
10% risk of a $60,000 loss. For her part, the subcontractor gets 90% of $5333.33, or $4800. In this
alternate contract, the subcontractor still bears the cost of lost reliance, but she pays for it indirectly rather
than directly. Essentially, she pays the contractor an actuarially fair insurance premium in the form of the
$6666.67 profits when the deal goes through. What is critical, however, is that she bind herself in advance
to pay this premium; the fixed-price option represents her promise not to expropriate the gains from
reliance. In contrast to the simple contract discussed in the text, this arrangement has the advantage of
encouraging the contractor to keep down the costs of reliance as well as to rely at the optimal moment.
74. If the contractor will not enter the deal unless he gets some minimum level of expected profits,
his insistence will affect the price the subcontractor includes in her take-it-or-leave-it offer, but will not
alter the basic logic of the argument. For example, suppose the contractor must have at least $900 to go
along with the deal. If the subcontractor waits to make her offer and the contractor waits to rely until the
last week, the subcontractor can charge a price of $3100 over cost, leaving the contractor his $900 profit.
If the transaction occurs in Week 3, she can charge a price of $11,000 over cost. This will give the
contractor his necessary expected profit of 90% of $1000, or $900, leaving expected profits for the
subcontractor of 90% of $11,000 less 10% of $60,000, or $3900. The subcontractor will still capture the
increased profits that stem from earlier reliance, so she will still have the incentive to make her offer at the
optimal time.
75. This situation would occur, for instance, if the offeror were one of many sellers in a competitive
market, if the offeree were the only possible customer in a market with excess capacity, or if the offeror
were highly impatient for a bargain, and the offeree were not. For a fuller discussion, see infra Section
V.A.
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freely revoke her offer. Now, the contractor knows he will suffer the costs of
wasted reliance if the subcontractor cannot perform. He also knows, however,
that if she does turn out to be available, he can always hire her to do the work
at cost. In that case, he will be able to keep the entire surplus resulting from
the job. If he begins work in Week 3, therefore, he will earn expected profits
of $4800: $12,000 profit with 90% probability, less a $60,000 loss with 10%
probability. This is the best he can do, so by rationally maximizing his own
profits, he acts just as an optimal social planner would direct. The contractor
does not need any legal protection to be induced to rely optimally; his
bargaining power provides adequate protection.
If, conversely, the contractor has all the bargaining power, no
subcontractor will want to commit to a binding option before the last week.
This is because, in order to break even on such an option, she must charge
enough of a profit to cover the reliance damages she must pay if she is unable
to perform. For example, a subcontractor offering a binding option in Week 3
would have to include a markup of $6000 over cost because, as soon as she
binds herself, the contractor will spend $60,000 in reliance and there is a 10%
chance that she will be held responsible for this expenditure. There is no
effective way, however, for the subcontractor to collect this necessary markup
while using an option contract. If it turns out that she is available to do the
work, which occurs 90% of the time, the contractor will not want to exercise
the option, for he can instead turn around and offer her or one of her
competitors a last-minute, take-it-or-leave-it offer to do the job at just over
cost. Such a last-minute offer would be irresistible, since this slight profit
would be better ex post than no deal at all. Accordingly, an early option is a
sure loser for the subcontractor without bargaining power, as she never makes
any profit from it and sometimes winds up paying for the contractor's wasted
reliance.76
Thus, if the contractor has the bargaining power and the legal system
regards relied-upon offers as binding options, as in Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., the contractor will have too much protection against wasted reliance and
the subcontractor will have too little. Rational subcontractors will then tend to
avoid making offers until the last possible moment, when the uncertainty over
their ability to perform will be resolved. This problem does not arise if the
contractor does not need to communicate with the subcontractor in order to
rely effectively. The contractor can begin work on his own, confident that
negotiations can take place at a later time. But if he needs to coordinate with
the subcontractor in order to prepare properly to make use of her performance,
76. This should make clear why the only reliance investments needing protection are those that are
specific to the transaction or relationship. If the offeree's investment is fully salvageable through resale or
a substitute contract, then there is no holdup problem. Because the offeree can then make the offeror
compete against all other possible market uses for the investment, he will have all the bargaining power,
and she will have none.
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as is more likely, delaying the offer will mean delaying or distorting the
reliance investment. A last-minute offer may mean no time for reliance at all.
Such incentives underlie the criticism, made by some of the more traditional
commentators on promissory estoppel, that too much liability for precontractual
communications runs the risk of chilling preliminary negotiations entirely.77
All this suggests that the efficiency of promissory estoppel in
precontractual negotiations turns on the relative bargaining power of the parties
ex post. If offerors have the bargaining power, then holding them responsible
for lost reliance under the estoppel doctrine promotes optimal reliance. If
offerees have the bargaining power, then optimal reliance requires them to bear
the risk of loss.
C. The Policy Problem
1. In Specific
Can we say whether the Baird or the Drennan rule is more efficient in the
context of precontractual negotiations? On the assumption that a substantial
number of contractors and subcontractors operate in local construction markets
(as ordinarily will be the case, else the underlying job would be awarded by
negotiations and not by an auction), we can. The Baird rule is better. While
various alternate contractual partners are available for negotiation beforehand,
once the general contract is awarded, the winning contractor tends to have the
bargaining power. He is the only one with whom the subcontractors can deal
on the underlying project and is thus in a monopoly position to expropriate any
specific investments they have made in preparing their bids. This conclusion
is supported by the common complaint on the part of subcontractors that
winning contractors engage in "bid shopping" or "bid chiseling" after the fact.
Specifically, they play rival subcontractors against each other in order to get
them to do the work for a price lower than their original bids.7"
If this account of the facts is correct, then Judge Hand had the better
appreciation for economic efficiency, as he often did. General contractors had
sufficient incentives for optimal reliance under Baird. They were perfectly
capable of insuring against lost reliance by including a margin of safety in the
price of their general contracts. Conversely, general contractors are
overprotected under the Drennan rule, and will tend to overrely. The
77. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 50, at 243. This set of incentives also poses the main
disadvantage to Professor Kostritsky's recent proposal that courts generally hold negotiating parties liable
for the reasonable value of all lost reliance by the other side. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with
Uncertainty Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS
LJ. 621, 672-73 (1993).
78. For a description of this practice, see Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of
Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 240-52 (1952).
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subcontractors who must pay for this overreliance cannot fully cover
themselves by marking up the price, since the contractor can bargain them
down once he has the contract in hand. As a result, subcontractors have an
incentive to delay excessively in making offers and, in extreme cases, to avoid
making offers entirely. This perhaps explains why, in practice, so many
subcontractors choose to make their offers at the last possible minute.79
This stereotyped scenario, of course, will not fairly describe all
construction contracts. There are surely some construction bidding disputes in
which the subcontractor holds the bargaining power ex post. In some
specialized lines of work, only a small number of potential subcontractors may
be available. The job may require unusual expertise, or arrangements may have
to be made far in advance, making it difficult to find a replacement if the
winning subcontractor withdraws after bidding is closed. In such cases, the
argument for the Drennan rule may be stronger.
In any event, the inferior incentives provided by the Drennan rule in the
construction industry have been partially moderated by later cases that have
limited a contractor's freedom to speculate ex post at the subcontractor's
expense. Specifically, general contractors who engaged in bid shopping or
chiseling after the award of a primary contract have been denied the benefit of
promissory estoppel.80 From the standpoint of promoting optimal reliance, this
appears to be a sensible limitation on the estoppel rule. The strongest cases for
applying promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations may not be in the
construction bidding cases at all.
2. In General
Regardless of which party holds the bargaining power, the practical
problem remains the same-the risk of holdup. Investing in a
relationship-specific asset makes the investor vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior after the fact. Because the asset is worth little outside the specific
relationship, the party with the bulk of the bargaining power can appropriate
its value; the party without bargaining power has nowhere else to go. For this
reason, he or she may wind up no better off for having made the investment
and, in the event that the relationship dissolves, will be worse off.
Encouraging specific investments in situations where one's counterpart
holds the bargaining power has long been recognized as a standard problem in
79. See the description of a typical construction bidding process in Dorothy H. Bishop, Comment, The
Subcontractor's Bid: An Option Contract Arising Through Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMoRY L.J. 421,
424-28 (1985). The comment takes the position, however, that the general contractor lacks bargaining
power and that it is the person offering the underlying job for bidding who is in the catbird seat. Id. at
426-27.
80. See Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B. & J. Constr. Co., 696 F2d 1080. 1089 (5th Cir. 1983).
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contracting and in business organization. 81 The simple model of the previous
section, in fact, closely resembles models developed by Oliver Hart and other
economists to describe analogous organizational problems such as the vertical
integration of a firm, the division of an insolvent company's assets, and the
allocation of corporate control between capital and labor.82 These models all
have a similar three-stage structure. In the first stage, the parties' property or
contract rights are established by the rule of law. In the second stage, the
parties choose whether and how to make any relationship-specific investments.
In the third stage, the parties bargain over any resulting productive surplus. For
example, in the case of insolvent companies, the parties' rights are set by
debtor-creditor law, the relationship-specific investments are the efforts they
make on the eve of insolvency to save or salvage the failing firm, and the
bargaining in the third stage takes place ur}der the auspices of a bankruptcy
court or in a prebankruptcy workout.
In this class of models, first-stage property and contract rights matter
because they set the framework for the bargaining that takes place in the third
stage. Different legal rules change what the parties can obtain in the absence
of a cooperative agreement, altering the threats and offers available to them.
These background alternatives, along with relative bargaining power, determine
the respective shares of surplus that the parties are able to obtain in the end;
and these expected shares in turn determine their incentives to make specific
investments in stage two. For example, such models suggest the importance of
giving control rights within a firm to those persons whose investments in
human capital are complementary with and specific to the firm's physical and
financial assets: skilled workers, for instance, who must spend long hours
learning how to use specialized machinery. Otherwise, such persons will
anticipate that the fruits of their investments will go primarily to the owners
of the physical and financial assets and will lack sufficient incentives to invest.
The business organization literature has focused primarily on property
rights, but the same lesson applies to contract rights as well. Indeed, the
problem of opportunism remains even after an official agreement is reached.
A party to an agreement might demand a unilateral modification, or insist on
8I. See generally Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978) (arguing that riskiness of specific investments determines
efficient choice between contracting and vertical integration); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Goveniance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcON. 233 (1979) (discussing specific
investments as type of transaction cost). For an insightful discussion of the problem in the precontractual
setting, see G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward
a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221, 228-51 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986) (applying model to vertical integration);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Propery, Rights and the Nature of the Firm. 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990)
(providing mathematical exposition of basic model); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory
of the Finn, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989) (offering nonmathematical exposition of basic model); Bengt
R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Finn, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (surveying research in field).
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interpreting ambiguous terms and exercising discretionary ones to his or her
sole advantage. Once a contract has been concluded, however, the law deploys
a variety of doctrinal tools to limit such opportunistic behavior. Under common
law, the preexisting-duty rule83 and the rule of Foakes v. Beer 4 invalidated
contract modifications not accompanied by fresh consideration. Under modem
doctrine, the requirement that modifications be fair and equitable in light of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties 85 or, in sales cases, that they be
86in good faith, serves a similar function. More generally, the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing8 7 serves a similar purpose. Such rules free
contracting parties to invest in their relationship without fear that their
investments will be expropriated.
Protecting specific investments in preliminary negotiations, however, raises
more difficult problems than does protecting them after a contract has been
signed. Once there is a contract, holdups in the form of unilateral modifications
can be policed by enforcing the original bargain. In the precontractual setting,
in contrast, there is no specific bargain to enforce. It is difficult to prevent
reliance investments from being expropriated by a subsequent adjustment in the
contract price or other terms of the bargain. As a result, one's natural response
is to find some preliminary communication-an offer, an estimate, a tentative
prediction of the bargain-and enforce that instead. And this has been the
courts' approach under the modem law of promissory estoppel.
As the previous discussion showed, however, whether treating early offers
as binding options solves the problem of opportunism depends on which party
holds the bargaining power. In situations in which offerors hold the bulk of the
bargaining power, the rule of Restatement (Second) section 87(2) may indeed
make sense. By forcing the offeror to bear the costs of precontractual reliance,
the law gives her the incentive to weigh those costs against the benefits she
obtains from it. In situations in which offerees hold the bulk of the bargaining
power, however, the common law rule of free revocability makes more sense,
for in that case it is the offeree who needs the incentives. Furthermore, if
bargaining power is equally distributed between the parties, there may be no
particular efficiency advantage to either rule. In that case, the advocates of
simple convention maintenance would be right; public decisionmakers would
be better off sticking to a clear default rule while private parties adjust their
expectations to it. Of course, persons who know more about their individual
bargaining power than does the legislature might wish to contract around this
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 73.
84. See 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 89(a).
86. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1 (1994).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4. § 205 (implied duties of good faith and fair dealing);
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) (general requirement of good faith).
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general default rule, just as some business organizations choose to contract
around the default rules of corporate control.
In Section V.B of this Article, I survey a number of other commercial
settings and apply my basic model to them. First, however, it is necessary to
explore several complications to the analysis.
IV. EXTENDING THE REGULATORY ANALYSIS
The discussion of Part III considered only the simplest reliance decisions.
I assumed that only one party to the transaction faced the opportunity to rely,
that reliance took the form of a one-time investment, and that the risk of
revocation came only from the offeror. I also assumed that both sides had full
information about the costs and benefits of reliance and about the risk that the
exchange would fall through. With these simplifying assumptions, I was
nonetheless able to reach several important insights. First, the value of an
exchange is maximized when reliance takes place at the optimal time. Second,
optimal reliance is best promoted when a party in the position to influence that
reliance's timing enjoys both its costs and its benefits. Third, both the
distribution of bargaining power and the legal rules allocating the costs of
wasted reliance help determine which party pays the costs of reliance and
which one enjoys its benefits.
In most actual transactions, of course, reliance decisions are more
complicated. There may be multiple opportunities for the parties to invest in
transaction-specific assets, and there is some chance that either party will be
unable or unwilling to go through with the exchange. The parties may be
averse to risk. The chance of a failed bargain may be influenced by the
precautions the parties take in preparation: for instance, by laying in an
inventory of extra materials or spare parts, making sure one has sufficient
production capacity, or simply by considering more fully whether one really
wants to go through with the deal before making a bid. It may also be that one
side has better information about the likelihood that the bargain Will fall
through. For example, the seller, based on her experience in marketing goods,
may know more than the buyer about the possibility of alternate buyers with
higher-value uses showing up at the last minute.
Some of these issues have already been addressed in the literature on the
economics of contracts. It has been recognized for some time how the prospect
of liability can influence parties' incentives to perform, breach, take
precautions against breach, mitigate damages, and make relationship-specific
investments after a contract is signed. 88 More recently, lawyers and
economists have analyzed the incentives that legal doctrine provides for parties
88. See Cooter, supra note 65, at 11-19; Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for
Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121 (1984).
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to discover and share information during negotiations-both about the amount
of damages in the event of breach, and about the likelihood of breach itself.89
In particular, Richard Craswell has argued that rules, like that of Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, that make promisors liable for reliance damages, provide
efficient incentives for parties engaged in preliminary negotiations to
investigate and disclose the likelihood that an offer will actually be
forthcoming before making any promises.90
It turns out, though, that the basic lessons of the preceding analysis remain
valid notwithstanding these additional complications. I will want to expand the
scope of the inquiry beyond the distribution of bargaining power; and it may
be that we have to settle for a second-best result, in contrast to the complete
efficiency achieved in the simple example. But we will still want to place the
cost of wasted reliance on the least-cost avoider. These other
complications-multiple reliance investments, information, incentives to take
precautions against having to withdraw-are all relevant to this overall goal.
But in general it remains the case that incentives are most efficient when the
party who gains the bulk of the anticipated benefits from reliance also pays the
cost when it is wasted. In this part, I will briefly survey a number of variations
on this theme and relate my basic conclusions to previous work in the
economics of contracts.
A. Risk Aversion and Insurance
In the discussion so far, I have assumed that the parties are risk-neutral,
that is, that they view an uncertain prospect as equivalent to its expected value:
the amount of the gain or loss in question multiplied by the probability of its
occurrence. In general, however, most people are averse to risk and willing to
pay a premium to avoid it. This is why relatively risky assets pay a higher
return in the market than relatively safe ones; they have to in order for
investors to be willing to hold them.9'
Reliance investments are no exception to this general rule. Risk-averse
parties would prefer to give up some of the productive returns from a reliance
investment in exchange for reducing the risk that the investment will be
89. For analyses that discuss asymmetric information over the amount of damages, see Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, supra note 8 (proposing penalty default rules as information-
forcing device); Johnston, supra note 8 (criticizing Ayres-Gertner proposal). For discussions of asymmetric
information regarding the probability of breach, see Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-
Sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989) [hereinafter Craswell, Performance] (discussing
incentives for promisor to reveal information regarding probability of performance); Richard Craswell,
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988) [hereinafter
Craswell, Precontractual Investigation] (discussing incentives to gather information about probability of
performance).
90. See Craswell, Performance, supra note 89: Craswell. Precontractual Investigation, supra note 89.
91. For an introduction to risk aversion and the economic theory of choice under uncertainty, see
generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186-205 (1987).
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entirely wasted. What this means in practice is that they will prefer to make
such investments somewhat later than they would if they were risk-neutral. To
illustrate, consider Table 2, which presents a variation on the example of
Table 1. Both parties now regard an uncertain loss as worse than its expected
value. In the example, I assume a risk premium of 10%. For instance, a 20%
chance of losing $60,000 is seen as equivalent to a sure loss of $13,200 (20%
x $60,000, plus 10% for the risk). Similarly, a 15% chance of losing $60,000
is seen as equivalent to a sure loss of $9900, not $9000. The discounted lost
reliance, adjusted for this risk premium, is shown in column (b') of the table.
The expected net profits from the transaction must also be adjusted for risk
aversion. Adjusted profits are found in column (e'). Each entry in this column
is calculated by taking discounted net profits and subtracting from it the risk-
adjusted cost of lost reliance found in column (b').92 Inspection of the
numbers shows that for risk-averse parties, early reliance is discounted
relatively heavily and later reliance relatively less so. The difference this
makes can be seen by comparing columns (e) and (e'). It is still profitable to
rely-just not as far in advance as it is when the parties are risk-neutral. With
risk aversion, expected net profits are highest when reliance occurs in Week
4. Social efficiency should also take account of the parties' attitudes toward
risk, since risk is a real economic commodity and its reduction is of real value.
Thus in Table 2, delaying reliance until Week 4 is optimal as well.
But all this affects only the specific numerical calculations of the example.
It does not alter the logic of the general argument, or its conclusions. The costs
of wasted reliance, risk premium and all, should still be placed on the least-
cost avoider. With or without risk aversion, a contractor without any
bargaining power will not wish to rely if the subcontractor can freely revoke,
because he bears the costs and reaps none of the benefits. With or without risk
aversion, a contractor with all the bargaining power will rely optimally under
a rule of free revocation because he reaps the benefits along with the costs. He
will choose to rely later than he would if he were risk-neutral, but that is as
it should be. Conversely, a subcontractor with bargaining power can still
protect herself under the rule of the Restatement (Second) by committing to a
binding option in advance. The price of the option will include a risk premium,
and the subcontractor will delay offering it until Week 4-but again, that is
just what is needed to maximize the surplus from the transaction.
92. Strictly speaking, the productive value of investment should be discounted by a risk premium to
reflect the fact that it is uncertain as well, but I ignore this complication for the sake of simplicity.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (c')
START CHANCE OF DISCOUNTED LOST POTENTIAL DISCOUNTED EXPECTED NET WITH RISK
WEEK BREACH RELIANCE WITH PROFITS PROFITS PROFITS PREMIUM
RISK PREMIUM (c) x (1 - (a)) (d) - ((a) x (d) - (b')
((a) x $60,000) + $60,000)
10%
1 20% $13,200 $20,000 $16,000 $4000 $2800
2 15% $9900 $16,000 $13,600 $4600 $3700
3 10% $6600 $12,000 $10,800 $4800 $4200
4 5% $3300 $8000 $7600 $4600 $4300
5 0% $0 $4000 $4000 $4000 $4000
TABLE 2. Optimal Reliance with Risk Aversion
Risk aversion can alter the basic analysis in one respect, however; it can
influence our view of who is the least-cost avoider. The contracting parties
may have different attitudes toward risk, depending on their size, their ability
to investigate and control risk, or their access to diversification or insurance
markets. For example, one party may be a sole proprietorship while the other
may have many shareholders; in this case, risk borne by the former will come
out of the proprietor's pocket, while risk borne by the latter can be spread
among its shareholders and pooled with other risks in their portfolios. Or it
may be that one party's profits are a function of many independent variables,
so that unexpectedly high costs on one component or on one job tend to be
balanced by low costs on others. If the parties do differ in their costs of
bearing risk, then it will be efficient, other things being equal, to place the risk
of wasted reliance on the one who can bear risk more cheaply.93
If the party who can insure against risks more cheaply is not the one with
the bargaining power, then we face a trade-off among costs, the precise nature
of which will depend on the distribution of bargaining power. For instance, if
the stronger bargainer can appropriate the entire gain from exchange ex post,
then relative risk aversion should be ignored. Placing the cost of wasted
reliance on a more risk-averse party is not ideal, but placing it on one with no
bargaining power whatsoever is worse. Even if he is risk-neutral, his
vulnerability to holdup makes him entirely unwilling to rely in advance.
Indeed, even if the stronger bargainer has less than absolute power, it may be
93. For a general discussion of risk allocation, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach
of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).
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better to put the risk of lost reliance on her, if her cost advantage in bearing
it is sufficiently great.
In the majority of cases, however, there may be no real trade-off in
requiring the party with more bargaining power to pay the costs of wasted
reliance. Risk aversion, after all, is one of the key determinants of bargaining
power. Successful bargaining often requires bluffing, threatening, and holding
out. All these strategies involve the risk that the bargaining will delay the deal
or even end in failure. Negotiators who are more willing to take this risk are
likelier to get the lion's share; those who find it costlier to bear this risk are
likelier to yield. 94 For instance, an employee who has quit a previous job in
reliance on an offer of employment is likely to have relatively limited
resources to bankroll a long negotiation; he may be ineligible for
unemployment insurance, and may not be able to take a temporary or
alternative position without giving up the one for which he is negotiating. A
large employer, on the other hand, has many employees whom the employer
can temporarily redeploy or work overtime. This imbalance in the parties'
negotiating power comes down to a difference in their ability to spread and
diversify unexpected costs. The same characteristics that help determine which
side can better bear risk in general-size, access to diversification, and
insurance markets-thus also tend to determine which can better bear risk in
bargaining.
B. Multiple Reliance Investments
In the basic analysis, I assumed that there was need for only a single
reliance investment. If multiple reliance investments are possible, it will
generally be optimal to sink them at different times.
For example, negotiating parties might optimally delay turning down other
contractual partners until late in the negotiations when most uncertainty has
been resolved, while they may take on other forms of reliance, such as hiring
unskilled workers or renting multipurpose machinery, early on. But such fine-
tuning may not be possible under a regime in which enforcing courts are not
able directly to measure and supervise the efficiency of reliance. If instead the
offeror's obligation must come into force at a single moment, it may be
necessary to balance the timing of investments. This may mean making one
investment later than would be ideal, in order to prevent another from being
sunk too early. But it is still optimal, given this qualification, to put the cost
of lost reliance on the least-cost avoider-in general, the party with the
bargaining power. For example, suppose that in the basic example the
contractor faces two possible reliance investments. The pipes used for
plumbing can be partially salvaged for another job if this one falls apart, so it
94. On the relation of risk aversion to bargaining power, see infra Section V.A.
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would be optimal to begin installing them four weeks in advance of the
planned exchange. The electrical wiring, however, cannot be salvaged at
reasonable cost, so it is optimal to hold off on installing it until two weeks
before the exchange. If the general contractor has all the bargaining power, and
the legal rule makes him bear the cost of wasted reliance, there is no problem.
He will properly internalize the risk of waste for each investment; he will also
anticipate reaping all the returns if the job is completed. As a result, he will
bear both the costs and the benefits and will have incentives to make both
investment decisions optimally. If, on the other hand, the legal rule puts the
cost of wasted reliance on the powerless subcontractor, she will want to wait
until the last possible moment to make her offer, sacrificing all the potential
benefits from reliance.
Conversely, if the subcontractor has all the bargaining power, it is best to
place the cost of wasted reliance on her. The contractor will not be willing to
do any work ahead of time absent a binding option, for the same reasons as
before; he will bear all the risk of waste and will receive none of the
productive benefits. But in this situation, the first-best solution may no longer
be achievable. The subcontractor, who can now capture the gains from
reliance, will be willing to offer a binding option in advance-but it is unclear
how far in advance. If she waits to grant the option until two weeks ahead of
time, the contractor will install the wiring at the proper time, but install the
pipes too late. If she grants it four weeks ahead of time, the contractor will
install the pipes at the proper time, but will also have every reason to go ahead
and install the wiring as well.
What the subcontractor would like to do is give the contractor enough
assurances four weeks in advance to induce him to start on the pipes, but to
delay any assurances relating to the wiring until two weeks in advance. If
reliance expenditures are specifically contractible, she can do this, for instance,
by offering a binding option conditional on a two-week delay before installing
any wiring. Such an offer will guarantee her a first-best outcome and all the
expected profits that result. The special condition will require additional
negotiations, however; and enforcing such a condition ex post will require
proving to a court's satisfaction both the condition's existence and whether it
has been met-all of which are costly. If the time of reliance cannot be
contracted for and verified at reasonable cost, it will instead be necessary to
draw a balance between the timing of the two investments.
In general, reaching the optimal balance will mean sacrificing the ideal
timing on one investment to avoid even greater inefficiency on the other-a
second-best outcome. For instance, in the example above, it may be best to
begin both the plumbing and electrical work three weeks in advance, rather
than two or four, given that there is no way to provide incentives to make the
two investments at different times. But so long as the subcontractor has the
bargaining power and the legal rule makes her bear the costs of wasted
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reliance, she will have the correct incentives to choose the second-best
outcome. She can determine the right starting date, and guarantee herself the
profits associated with it, by making her offer three weeks ahead of time.
Putting the risk on the powerless contractor, in contrast, means no incentives
for reliance at all.
I have so far been assuming that all the reliance investments are made by
the offeree. If both parties can rely, the analysis has to be modified further, but
the basic intuition remains: It is still best to place responsibility for lost
reliance on the party with the bulk of the bargaining power. To see this, let us
change the last example slightly. Suppose that the contractor is responsible for
the electrical work and plumbing, and the subcontractor is responsible for the
heating, cooling, and ductwork. Both parties can lower their cost of
performance by buying special materials in advance, but the project is a
custom job and if it cannot be completed these materials will be wasted. On
the same reasoning as before, there exists an optimal time for the contractor's
reliance and an optimal time-in general a different one-for the
subcontractor's reliance.
If the subcontractor has the bargaining power, she will have the incentive
to make her investment correctly, but the contractor will not unless his reliance
expenditures are protected by a binding option. Interpreting the subcontractor's
offer as such an option, moreover, will induce her to make it at the right time,
and all reliance investments will be optimal. If the contractor has the
bargaining power, conversely, we have a different problem. Now the contractor
has the proper incentives to rely and the subcontractor does not. In this case,
efficiency requires the contractor to be legally bound in order to protect the
subcontractor. The law could achieve this either by having the contractor offer
the subcontractor a binding option, or by having the subcontractor offer the
contractor a mutually binding bilateral contract. The important thing is that the
contractor somehow binds himself not to appropriate the fruits of the
subcontractor's reliance investment through his superior bargaining power.
C. Tivo-Sided Uncertainty
The discussion so far has also assumed that the only uncertainty regarding
the completion of the bargain concerns the offeror's performance. In actual
transactions, of course, there is some risk that either party will be unable or
unwilling to perform. None of the foregoing analysis, however, depends on a
particular side being the origin of the uncertainty. So long as both sides have
equally good information about the costs and benefits of reliance and the total
risk of waste, the logic of the argument is unchanged. There is still an optimal
time at which to rely, and an offeree lacking bargaining power will not rely
properly unless he is given a binding option at that time. Conversely, if the
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offeror lacks the bargaining power, she will refuse to offer any option before
all the uncertainty is resolved.
To illustrate, consider the following variation on the example in Table 1.
In Week 1, there is a 10% chance that the subcontractor will be unable to
perform, and a separate and additional 10% chance that the contractor will be
unable to perform. The total chance that the bargain will fail to come to pass
is 20%.95 As before, suppose that the chances of nonperformance decline
steadily over the precontractual period, so that in Week 2 the chance of each
party withdrawing is 7.5%, for a total risk of 15%, and so on. Then the
economics of the situation, and all the calculations, are identical to the original
example. Specifically, it is still optimal to rely in Week 3, and a contractor
with bargaining power will happily do so even without the protection of
promissory estoppel. A contractor without bargaining power, on the other hand,
will not rely unless the subcontractor binds herself in advance to perform at
a fixed price. A subcontractor with bargaining power will be willing to do
this-either explicitly, or in the form of an offer made binding by promissory
estoppel.96 A subcontractor without bargaining power, however, will refuse
to issue a binding option in advance, and if the law treats her offers as such,
she will delay and make them past the optimal moment.
Accordingly, efficient reliance is still promoted by putting the costs of lost
reliance on the party with the bulk of the bargaining power. This will mean,
perhaps counterintuitively, making that party pay for lost reliance even when
it is occasioned by the default or withdrawal of the other side. 97 The reason
for this result is that, so long as the parties have equally good information
about the risk of a failed bargain and so long as this risk is exogenous, the
party with the bargaining power is still the least-cost avoider. If information
95. To keep the arithmetic simple, I suppose that the two events are mutually exclusive; it will never
be the case that both parties are unable to perform. Nothing turns on this except the round numbers.
96. There are a variety of option contracts that will do this. The simplest would provide the
subcontractor with a price of $12,000 above cost in the event of performance, but would bind her to pay
for lost reliance no matter which side was unable to perform. The subcontractor would then earn expected
revenues of $10,800 and pay out expected reliance losses of $6000, for net profits of $4800-the maximum
available. Alternatively, the subcontractor could disclaim liability for all lost reliance but bind herself to
a price that allows the contractor enough profits to cover the expected cost of an insurance premium for
lost reliance; this would mean a price of $5333.33 above cost, as demonstrated supra note 73. Or the
subcontractor could agree in her option to pay for lost reliance if she withdraws but could disclaim liability
for reliance if the contractor is unable to perform; many readers may find this arrangement most natural.
In order for the contractor to go along with this, however, she will have to bind herself to a price that
allows him enough profits to cover this expected loss. Specifically, if 5% of the time he cannot perform
and must pay $60,000 in wasted reliance, this is $3000 of expected losses that must be covered by the 90%
of cases in which the contract proceeds as planned. This means the contractor must be assured of profits
of $3333.33 in those cases-so the subcontractor must commit to a price of $8666.67 above cost (that is,
$12,000 - $3333.33). It should be recognized that the subcontractor is still bearing all the costs of wasted
reliance under each of these option contracts, including costs resulting from the contractor's failure to
perform. Even when she disclaims liability for reliance, she pays the contractor an actuarially fair insurance
premium sufficient to cover it in the form of a lowered price.
97. As the previous note showed, however, this payment need not be a direct one. It may instead take
the form of a price reduction in an amount equivalent to the fair insurance premium against lost reliance.
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about risks is not equally distributed, however, or if the parties have differing
abilities to control risks, this may not be the case. This brings us to the next
two variations.
D. Asymmetric and Imperfect Information
One commonly offered justification for promissory estoppel is
misrepresentation-that the promise misled the promisee. In the discussion so
far, I have sidestepped this argument by assuming that both parties to the
exchange have equally good information. An offeree without accurate
information about costs, benefits, and risks is unlikely to be the least-cost
avoider, however, even if he enjoys all the gains from the exchange and pays
all the losses from wasted reliance. If he mistakenly thinks that the probability
of nonperformance is lower than it really is, he will rely earlier than he should
from a social viewpoint. If, conversely, he thinks the probability is higher than
it really is, he will rely too late.
A rule of free revocation, therefore, poses problems if the offeror is better
informed than the offeree about the risk of revocation. In this case, the offeror
will want reliance to take place earlier than would be optimal. Early reliance
means increased gains when the bargain goes forward, and the offeror will
enjoy at least a fraction of these gains so long as she is not utterly without
bargaining power. The associated increase in wasted reliance, however, is
borne by the offeree alone. Accordingly, the offeror with superior information
has an incentive to try to induce early reliance by misrepresenting the risk.
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores offers a possible illustration. Since Red Owl stood
to receive a fraction of the revenues from the business under their standard
franchise contract, they benefited substantially from the Hoffmans' early
reliance. While the Hoffmans had some experience in running a grocery, they
were new to franchising and knew less than the defendants did about the
factors that would govern the decision whether to award a franchise. Red Owl
certainly had better information about its own internal procedures and about
the actual authority of its regional agent, who had made most of the specific
representations that induced the Hoffmans to rely so heavily.98
Hoffinan is usually regarded as an extreme case, and it has not often been
followed despite its prominence in the casebooks and the commentary.99 But
it illustrates an important general point. The risk of a revocation or withdrawal
98. On the other hand, the Hoffmans had better information than Red Owl did about the sources of
their financing, which ostensibly turned out to be the ultimate deal breaker. It is unclear from the court
opinion whether or not this objection was a pretext on Red Owl's part, however, and the court seemed to
treat it as one. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Wis. 1965).
99. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.26, at 311 ("Although the decision in Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores has not been warmly embraced in later opinions, it has attracted the attention of commentators and
may ultimately provoke a significant reappraisal of attitudes toward the bargaining process." (footnote
omitted)).
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often turns on the factual circumstances of the offeror's business, and the
offeror will generally be better informed about these circumstances than the
offeree. Admittedly, a more sophisticated offeree (at least, more sophisticated
than the Hoffmans) who realizes his inferior informational position could
protect himself by attaching an appropriate discount to the offeror's
representations and delaying his reliance accordingly. But even this response
would not be fully efficient, since the discount and resulting delay would
reflect the average risk across all similar transactions, not the actual risk in the
particular instance. For some offers, the actual risk of revocation is lower than
the market average and the extra delay is unnecessary; for others, the risk is
higher than average and the delay is insufficient. The problem is asymmetric
information, and the proper response may be an information-forcing
rule-what Ayres and Gertner have labeled a "penalty default." By holding
liable the party with superior information, the law can provide an incentive for
disclosure. Other things being equal, this is an efficient rule because it
encourages reliance decisions to be made on the best information possible.)°
Similarly, even if neither party is in actual possession of information about
the risk of nonperformance, one of them may be able to discover such
information at lower cost than the other. There is always some chance that any
offer has been issued by mistake or that further reflection will reveal it was ill
considered. One way to guard against this is to put more effort into
formulating the offer in the first place. The calculation errors in Drennan and
Baird illustrate this possibility. Though there was no allegation in either Baird
or Drennan that the subcontractors were negligent in calculating their bids,
they were very likely in a better position than the contractors to prevent such
errors. Since neither bid was so low as to put the contractor on notice of an
obvious mistake, it would have been easier for each bidding subcontractor to
recheck her figures than for the contractor to recheck all bids he received.
More generally, those who make offers are ordinarily better able to obtain
information regarding the risk of revocation or withdrawal than those who
receive them. Putting the cost of lost reliance on offerors is a way of providing
them incentives to search for and discover such information.' 0'
This is not the full story, however. We must also worry about the parties'
information regarding the costs and benefits of the reliance investment; here
the offeree is likely to have superior information. He knows his resale market
and where to buy complementary inputs. He knows more about the other
opportunities he must turn down, and how well they substitute for the primary
bargain. If the offeree's costs are psychic or nonpecuniary, indeed, it may be
impossible for the offeror or anyone else to know their magnitude reliably. Of
100. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, supra note 8, at 97. Craswell defends
the doctrine of promissory estoppel on just these grounds. See Craswell, Performance, supra note 89, at
366-67.
101. See Craswell, Precontractual Investigation, supra note 89, at 408.
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course, reliance or expectation damages that are entirely unforeseeable to the
offeror will be limited by the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale'0 -z the
classic example of a penalty default. 0 3 But even with this limitation, the
offeree's superior information will still put him in a relatively better position
to make the relevant cost-benefit analysis, other things being equal.
What this all means is that informational asymmetries must also be
considered when searching for the least-cost avoider. If the offeror's
information is vastly better, as in cases of misrepresentation or unilateral
mistake, then she should be held liable for the offeree's lost reliance.
Conversely, if the offeree's information is vastly better, as in cases falling
under the Hadley principle, then he should be liable for his own lost reliance.
But in less extreme cases, information should be factored in with all the other
considerations I have identified: relative risk aversion, the presence of multiple
investments, and so on. The basic intuition, though, remains the same. For
optimal timing of reliance, we want to put the loss from wasted reliance on the
person in the best position to anticipate getting the gains from it at the end of
the game, for that is the person with the best incentive to do the cost-benefit
analysis. This will tend to be the party with the bargaining power, and it will
also tend to be the party who is better informed.
We still need to take account of bargaining power, however, as a primary
consideration in the search for the least-cost avoider. Even if one party has
superior information or ability to gather information, he or she will not wish
to disclose it if the other side has all the bargaining power. Disclosure in that
case is particularly dangerous; it will merely mean that the dominant bargainer
appropriates all the benefits of full information in the form of a price change.
As a result, the relatively well informed party will prefer to keep quiet, to
delay the reliance investment, and to bear any remaining costs of wasted
reliance.'O° In many if not most cases, however, there will be no conflict
between putting the cost of lost reliance on the party with superior bargaining
power and putting it on the party with superior information. Superior
information, like a taste for risk, is an advantage in bargaining. The party who
knows the other's reservation price can get more of the gains from trade, other
things being equal; a party who can conceal his or her own bottom line has a
102. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
103. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, supra note 8, at 101; see also
William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241,
252-60 (1983).
104. It is for this reason that penalty default rules do not work well when the less informed party has
all the bargaining power the informed party would rather take the risk of liability than yield the
informational advantage to the stronger bargainer. Cf. Shavell, supra note 8, at 33 (stating that incentives
to investigate quality of property before exchange depend on ability to capture gains from better-quality
information in exchange). See generally Johnston, supra note 8, at 620-23 (arguing that rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale is not efficient when carrier is a monopolist).
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corresponding advantage. The franchisor in Hoffman, for this reason, probably
had the stronger bargaining position as well as better information.
E. Incentives to Reduce the Risk of Revocation
We have been supposing that the risk that performance is impractical or
uneconomical is an exogenous event, outside the control of either party. In
many if not most cases, however, both sides will be able to take precautions
not just to discover this risk, but to reduce it-albeit at a cost. In the basic
example laid out in Table 1, for instance, delay in the subcontractor's previous
job need not make her performance impossible. If she had invested in a larger
stock of machinery and hired a larger workforce in the first place, she would
have enough capacity to complete both jobs. And even without this extra
capacity, she might still be able to go out and hire additional workers and
machinery on a short term basis. Whether it is worth her doing so, of course,
depends on whether the value of maintaining the contract justifies the cost.
This is the same problem that the doctrine of efficient breach
addresses. 05 The rules of contract damages affect whether contracting parties
find it in their interests to complete their bargains or to take precautions so that
they will be able to complete. As is widely recognized, liability for the
disappointed party's lost expectations (and for reliance losses, insofar as they
approximate expectation) provides efficient incentives in this regard. This is
because holding a promisor liable for the actual losses stemming from a failed
bargain gives her the proper incentives to balance these losses against her costs
of performance.
The goal of efficient breach suggests, at first glance, that offerors should
be held liable for their offers whether or not there has been an acceptance,
since this will encourage them to take proper precautions against
nonperformance. But this argument proves too much; indeed, on the same
logic, perfect strangers to the transaction ought to be charged with liability
also, to give them proper incentives as well in the event that their later
participation turns out to be relevant. A better solution lies in the least-cost
avoider principle, since even though strangers could take some precautions,
their incentives are much less important than those of the parties. Similarly, the
offeree's incentives may be more important than the offeror's. He may be able
to reduce the risk of a failed bargain by altering his own plans, to reduce costs
by mitigating, or to reduce or delay his reliance in the first place. We need to
determine whether these precautions are more or less effective than those that
the offeror could take.
105. I have ignored efficient breach until now because other scholars have thoroughly discussed it in
the literature. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 65, at 11-19 (illustrating economics behind efficient breach);
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 1438-44 (outlining basic damage formulas); Shavell, supra note 65,
at 9-22 (describing conditions under which breach is efficient).
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In the end, as the existing literature recognizes, we may not be able to
provide efficient incentives across all dimensions of the potential
transaction. 0 6 Efficient breach, efficient precautions to avoid breach, efficient
mitigation, efficient risk bearing, and efficient reliance-these multiple
objectives cannot be promoted by a single legal rule without some
compromise. Instead, we need to choose priorities and decide along which
dimension it is most important to provide incentives. Precaution incentives,
therefore, are yet another element of the least-cost avoider inquiry, along with
information, risk aversion, and bargaining power. As before, however,
bargaining power remains critical for the decision to rely, since charging an
offeror with the costs of a failed bargain will do little good if she cannot share
in the benefits of a successful one. Instead, it will just give her an incentive
to avoid making any communication that could be interpreted as an offer for
as long as possible. This result would not be efficient either. In the extreme,
she may even shun the transaction.
F. When Courts Can Police the Efficiency of Reliance
Throughout the discussion, I have focused on identifying which party to
the transaction is the least-cost avoider. Assigning losses to the least-cost
avoider, however, is a second-best strategy, used because it is too difficult to
supervise reliance decisions directly. The idea is to delegate the responsibility
of performing a cost-benefit analysis to the party best suited to carrying it out
when courts or regulatory authorities are not up to the task. 0 7
It can be argued, however, that Restatement (Second) section 90(1)
presupposes that courts can supervise reliance at least in part, since it tells
them not to protect reliance that could not reasonably have been foreseen and
to limit the remedy awarded as justice requires. While these doctrinal elements
are not equivalent to the efficiency criterion-the former can be read as
incorporating the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale and the latter as restating
the inherent limits of an equitable remedy-efficiency surely is relevant to
their application. Unreasonable reliance will not usually be foreseeable, and
justice will not usually favor a claimant whose reliance investment was
manifestly wasteful. Similarly, some notion of efficiency is inherent in a
number of other principles used to limit promisors' liability, ranging from the
duty to mitigate to basic notions of legal causation.'0 8 Indeed, Richard
106. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 1462 (cataloguing various dimensions of efficiency);
Polinsky, supra note 93, at 433-44 (asserting that, since optimal payment varies with parties' risk aversion,
no one remedy for breach of contract is uniformly appropriate); Shavell, supra note 65, at 16-17, 20-23
(asserting that relative performance of liability rules in terms of efficiency depends on knowledge victims
have about risks).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
108. See generally Cooter, supra note 65, at 29-36 (discussing ability of common law liability rules
to promote efficient behavior).
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Craswell has recently proposed that courts should understand a host of
doctrinal requirements across the field of offer and acceptance as based
implicitly on the underlying principle of efficient reliance. 09 How, then,
should the above analysis be modified if courts can partly condition liability
on the efficiency of the offeree's reliance?
First of all, as the preceding sections have made clear, nothing in the least-
cost avoider concept requires us to abandon the principles of mitigation,
foreseeability of damages, or proximate cause. These doctrines may not be
necessary in those special situations where one side or the other can capture
the entire gain from exchange, but, in the more general case, they do help to
promote efficient reliance. If bargaining power is distributed among the parties,
if the party with bargaining power lacks good information about costs and
benefits, or if multiple or variable reliance investments are possible, then both
offeror and offeree need incentives for efficient behavior. Even if it is best on
balance to bind the offeror to her offer, unlimited liability for lost reliance
creates a moral hazard for the offeree. Since he gets a positive fraction of the
benefits from reliance, insulating him from all its costs will encourage him to
rely as early and intensively as he can. Making him pay for his imprudence
will moderate these effects. Accordingly, courts should continue to deny
recovery for reliance that is clearly excessive or premature.
This is simply a concrete instance of a general principle of the economic
analysis of liability. If two people can influence the probability or magnitude
of some costly event, whether it is an automobile accident, a breach of
contract, or a conflict between competing uses of neighboring property, it is
desirable to give both some incentive to take precautions-what some authors
have called "double responsibility on the margin."" This is why strict
liability alone is generally inferior to strict liability with a contributory
negligence defense, and why a negligence rule is superior to no liability at
all."' Even if we can identify one side as the least-cost avoider in general,
we will still benefit by making the other bear the cost of its unreasonable or
fraudulent behavior in cases where we can recognize it as such.
The converse of this principle, however, is not true. The mere fact that an
offeree's reliance investment was efficient does not imply that it should be
protected. Rather, this depends on whether he is otherwise the least-cost
avoider. If the offeror has the bargaining power, for instance, then she should
pay for reasonable reliance; only then will the offeree have the proper
incentive to invest. But if the offeree has the bargaining power, he should pay
for his own reliance costs, whether reasonable or not. Placing liability on the
offeror in this case would separate responsibility for costs from enjoyment of
109. See Craswell, supra note 64 (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
110. E.g., Cooter, supra note 65, at 4.
111. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 66, at 1068.
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benefits. An offeror who sees only the potential costs of reliance will want to
reduce her investment below its optimal level by delaying or avoiding
negotiations. And the offeree, who sees only the benefits and none of the costs,
will have the incentive to boost his reliance in ways that courts may only
imperfectly supervise.
The basic lesson of the analysis remains: It is efficient to match the costs
of reliance with its benefits wherever possible, and this is best done by looking
primarily to the least-cost avoider-usually the party with the bargaining power
ex post.
V. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO PARTICULAR CASES
The previous parts offered a simple and general rule of thumb for
allocating the costs of wasted reliance in precontractual negotiations: Other
things being equal, the least-cost avoider is the party with the bulk of the
bargaining power. A more detailed inquiry, however, is necessary for this rule
to be of any help to legal decisionmakers in the diversity of settings they face.
Specifically, we need to look more closely at the concrete determinants of
bargaining power. In this part, after a brief review of those determinants, I
apply the analysis to a variety of actual and hypothetical cases. 
2
A. Determinants of Bargaining Power-A Brief Recap
Bargaining power in the context of wasted reliance is related but not
identical to market power as antitrust law conventionally defines it. In a market
with few sellers, many buyers, and barriers to new competition, we expect the
sellers to capture a relatively high fraction of the potential gains from trade
because they can credibly limit the number of exchanges into which they enter.
This artificial restriction in quantity forces the buyers into competition with
each other for the scarce supply, bidding up the price. The fewer the sellers,
the stronger is their position; a monopolist is in the strongest position of all.
Conversely, with few buyers and many potential sellers, the buyers, by limiting
their purchases, can force the sellers into competition with one another, thereby
bidding down the price. As a result, a monopsonist like General Motors will
be able to capture the larger share of the gains from trade with its specialized
suppliers. For such reasons, parties with monopoly or monopsony power in the
relevant market will be in the better position to capture the benefits of
precontractual reliance, other things being equal. As I argued in Section III.C,
112. For a fuller discussion of the determinants of bargaining power, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-87, 219-67 (1994). A more mathematically formal discussion can be
found in ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 275-92 (2d
ed. 1994). The classic informal discussion is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52
(2d ed. 1980).
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this is the situation of a general contractor with a major government contract
in hand, able to play rival subcontractors against each other through bid
shopping.
In many cases, however, conventional market power is of secondary
importance for the allocation of lost reliance. Recall that the economic test for
reliance is whether or not there has been a relationship-specific investment; if
the investment is salvageable, there is no lost reliance. Once a promisee has
sunk a relationship-specific investment, however, he has a competitive
advantage over other potential contractual partners. His costs of going forward
are less, and his expected returns from an exchange are higher. It is therefore
more profitable ex post for the promisor to deal with him as opposed to his
competitors; it is also more profitable for him to deal with the promisor. The
situation is now one of bilateral monopoly.
An example of such a situation would be a specialized auto parts supplier
that retools its production line to produce components for General Motors's
new model. In the original negotiations, General Motors can play potential
suppliers against each other to obtain a low contract price. After the contract
is awarded and the retooling has taken place, however, the supplier's former
competitors may have made other plans. They may have sunk specific
investments in other relationships, and it will be more costly for them to retool
at the last minute. Accordingly, GM would much rather deal with its original
subcontractor than with anyone else, and the subcontractor would much rather
deal with GM than retool to produce for another purchaser. Because it can no
longer play the subcontractor against its competitors, GM's monopoly power
ex ante has not fully translated into bargaining power ex post.
Of course, this phenomenon explains why parties like GM (as well as
other monopsonists such as the federal government) commonly find it
profitable to purchase complicated items from multiple sources." 3 It is worth
the extra costs of having two suppliers retool rather than one, even if there are
substantial economies of scale, in order to preserve monopsony power in the
event that modifications are necessary later on. But for many investments, the
costs of duplication exceed the advantages of preserving market power. And
for their part, parties who lack market power may be reluctant to make
relationship-specific investments without the protection of an exclusive
113. Various provisions of federal law encourage or require second sourcing for U.S. government
purchases. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (1994) (allowing exclusion from competitive bidding process
of particular sources for military procurement if necessary to establish or maintain alternative source of
supply); 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)(I) (1988) (same for public contracts). For discussions of second sourcing in
the private sector, see Shantanu Dutta & George John, Combining Lab Experiments and Industry Data in
Transaction Cost Analysis: The Case of Competition as a Safeguard, II J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 87
(1995); Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to
Attract Competition, 103 Q.J. ECON. 673 (1988). For a similar argument concluding that licensing a
proprietary technology to competitors may be profit-maximizing, see Andrea Shepard, Licensing to Enhance
Demand for New Technologies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 360 (1987).
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arrangement, for fear that their efforts will be expropriated. For all these
reasons, disputes over reliance will usually involve some degree of bilateral
monopoly.
In general, market power under bilateral monopoly will often be
asymmetric. Such bilateral monopoly will often be less than complete, for it
may be easier ex post for one party to find substitute partners than for the
other to do so. This can depend on the specific market involved, but it also
depends on the nature of the reliance itself. For instance, when a buyer's
reliance takes the form of turning away substitute suppliers, he weakens his
negotiating position relative to a seller who keeps open her option of dealing
with other purchasers. Reliance in the form of complementary investments
such as a retooled plant, in contrast, does not have the same strategic effect,
because it lessens competition symmetrically on both sides of the transaction.
Similarly, the parties' relative monopoly power depends on how appropriable
the reliance investment is-that is, the extent to which the relying party can
block others from appropriating its benefits in the absence of a final
agreement. Investments in information, for instance, such as an expert's
appraisal, an engineer's design, or an entrepreneur's marketing concept, are
notoriously difficult to monopolize without the protection of law, and it may
be relatively easy to find competitors willing to free ride on such endeavors
after the fact.
Even in the case of complete and symmetric bilateral monopoly, however,
bargaining power is not necessarily equal. Asymmetries in bargaining power
can come from a host of other asymmetries in the parties' situation, some of
which have already been discussed. For instance, one side may be more
impatient than the other to reach an early deal. Such impatience may result
from a higher per period cost of delay before a bargain is reached, as in the
case of a criminal defendant who must remain in jail during plea bargaining.
It may arise because one party discounts future profits at a higher rate than her
counterpart, who faces a lower interest rate in financial markets and can
therefore more cheaply borrow against a favorable but delayed agreement. A
party may also be impatient because there may be some significant chance that
he or she will be unable to enjoy the benefits of a delayed agreement at all, as
in the case of a buyer on the verge of bankruptcy or a partnership on the verge
of dissolution. In all these events, the impatient party's greater desire to reach
an early deal will lead him or her to offer earlier and larger concessions.' 4
Similarly, one side may be more averse to risk than the other, due to
differences in taste, size, or opportunities to diversify. A risk-averse party will
rationally make softer demands in bargaining as insurance against failing to
114. See MARTIN J. OsBORNE& ARIELRUBINSTEIN. BARGAINING AND MARKErS 51-52 (1990); Ariel
Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982) (offering
mathematical analysis).
1996] 1297
The Yale Law Journal
reach a deal altogether.1 5 Bargainers with more of a taste for risk will be
less willing to pay for such insurance, will make tougher demands, and will
garner a larger share of the gains," 6 other things being equal.
Informational asymmetries also affect the parties' relative bargaining
power. Recall that if one is uncertain about the other side's eagerness to enter
into a deal, it is worthwhile to hedge on one's settlement demand, balancing
the benefit of getting a larger share of the surplus if one's counterpart is eager
to reach settlement against the risk of delay or bargaining failure if he or she
is not. Therefore, a party desperate to reach a deal may nonetheless obtain a
significant share of the gains from trade if the other side is unaware of the
extent of his or her desperation; conversely, a nonchalant party cannot benefit
from nonchalance unless he or she can credibly communicate it. For this
reason, negotiators commonly find it advantageous to conceal their reservation
prices and go to great efforts to make the other side believe that they are
willing to conclude a bargain only on favorable terms. An opponent who can
see through such subterfuge will have a significant advantage.
Finally, parties who are better able to commit to their negotiating strategies
in advance will have a strategic advantage. Commitment by one bargainer
raises the other's cost of holding out for a better deal; the clearest case of this
is the take-it-or-leave-it offer. If one is faced with such an offer in a
negotiation that is not going to be repeated and believes that the underlying
threat to end the bargaining is credible, it pays to accept, even if one knows
that other more favorable deals are potentially available. The offeror's
commitment enables her to garner a larger share of the surplus. On the other
hand, if it is unclear whether this is really the final offer, it may pay to call the
offeror's bluff and see if she will back down; or, if similar negotiations are
expected on some other occasion, it may pay to force the offeror to act on her
threat in the hope of deterring similar threats in the future. Since it does not
pay to issue take-it-or-leave-it offers to those who can be expected to reject
them, an offeree's commitment to rejecting such threats will, over time,
increase the share of surplus he is able to obtain. Parties who can establish a
credible reputation for stubbornness, spite, or even irrationality will increase
their bargaining power, and those who are repeat players or who are engaged
in many negotiations simultaneously will find it easier and cheaper to do so.
In sum, the distribution of bargaining power depends on: (1) the number
of ex post competitors on both sides; (2) the appropriability of the reliance
investment; (3) the parties' attitudes toward delay; (4) the parties' attitudes
toward risk; (5) the parties' information about each other's willingness to enter
115. See supra Section IV.A.
116. See Alvin E. Roth, A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining, 53
ECONOMETRICA 207 (1985) (presenting mathematical demonstration that more risk-averse negotiators get
smaller share of bargaining surplus).
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into a deal; and (6) the parties' ability and incentive to establish and maintain
a reputation.
B. Relative Bargaining Power-A Selection of Examples
The foregoing list of factors suggests some straightforward empirical
generalizations. For instance, as between a monopolist and a firm on the
competitive fringe, the former is likely to have more bargaining power, other
things being equal. More importantly, as between a larger party and a smaller
one, the larger is likely to have more bargaining power. Large size usually
provides greater opportunity to spread and diversify risk and also makes it
easier to establish a reputation. Similarly, long-lived parties have more
bargaining power than short-lived ones; they not only have greater
opportunities to spread risk and to establish a reputation, but they also can
more easily borrow against expected future earnings and will likely attach a
lower discount rate to delay. For the same reasons, wealthy parties have an
advantage over poor ones, commercially experienced parties have an advantage
over newcomers, and governmental entities have an advantage over individual
citizens, other things being equal. Apart from these broad generalizations,
however, the distribution of bargaining power depends upon the specific
features of the business context, making it likely that different sectors and
regions of the economy and different markets and submarkets within those
sectors and regions will find different legal rules to be efficient. It will
necessarily fall to individual groups of contracting parties, therefore, to choose
the regime best suited to their situations. The following examples illustrate the
sort of analysis such parties will need to conduct in order to so choose.
1. Franchise Relationships
Both Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and Goodman v. Dicker involved
disputes between franchisors engaged in business across a national or regional
market and individual applicants for a local franchise who made franchise-
related investments before having a franchise in hand. The general rule of
thumb favors the applicants. Other things being equal, franchisors are in a
superior bargaining position relative to potential franchisees. There are many
more franchise applicants than there are franchisors, since an established and
reputable trademark is necessary to make franchising an economically valuable
enterprise. General business experience and access to a modest amount of
capital, in contrast, are sufficient to qualify an applicant to be a franchisee.
Additionally, franchisors typically impose limits on the number of franchises
they grant in order to provide each individual franchisee with an exclusive
market. The franchisors' relatively large size and geographically diversified
operations make them better able to bear risk and to establish a reputation for
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firm dealing. They are likely to have better information about franchisees'
financial situation than franchisees have about franchisors', if only on the basis
of the franchisees' applications. On the basis of their experience, franchisors
also will have better information about the business as a whole. Moreover, the
franchisors draft the language of the franchise agreement, usually in
standardized form. For these reasons, there is a strong argument for construing
franchise contracts in favor of protecting franchisees and their reliance
investments once the franchise contract is signed." 7 All the same arguments
apply to the precontractual setting. The behavior of the Hoffmans
notwithstanding, rational franchise applicants will be reluctant to make
investments specific to the franchise relationship. Optimal precontractual
reliance, then, will ordinarily require holding the franchisor liable for
precontractual representations and offers.
2. Lender-Borrower Disputes
In a number of recent cases," 8 courts have held banks and other lenders
liable for informal promises made in the course of loan negotiations that
ultimately concluded in a failure to extend credit. To the extent that it is
important to give credit applicants incentives to sink reliance investments or
to turn down other business opportunities before credit is actually extended,
these decisions appear efficient. Because of the information required of most
credit applicants, lenders generally have better information about borrowers'
willingness to accept stringent terms than borrowers do about lenders. Because
of their access to wholesale credit markets, lenders face a lower rate of interest
and thus can afford to apply a lower discount rate to the returns from a
delayed agreement. Borrowers also have a higher discount rate for delay than
do lenders because they face a greater risk of going out of business.
On the other hand, borrowers may be less risk-averse than lenders by
virtue of their limited resources, It is generally recognized that firms and
individuals on the edge of insolvency have an incentive to behave in a risk-
preferring fashion, since they capture the upside gains of a gamble while being
protected from the downside losses by limited liability." 9 This attitude
toward risk, produced by having nothing to lose, will translate into a more
aggressive bargaining posture and may provide borrowers with an edge in
117. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 984-90 (1990).
118. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1988)
(upholding jury award in favor of appellees on estoppel claim); Johnston v. State Bank. 195 N.V.2d 126
(Iowa 1972) (holding that bank is liable to builder pursuant to bank's letter advising existence of loan
commitment to property owner); Bixler v. First Nat'l Bank, 619 P.2d 895 (Or. 1980) (upholding jury
verdict in favor of appellant on promissory estoppel claim but modifying damages award).
119. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosensweig. The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101
YALE L.J. 1043 (1992).
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negotiations. Furthermore, borrowers can engage in various sorts of
misbehavior if lenders become unilaterally bound to extend them credit in
advance of a final agreement. They can withdraw assets from the underlying
enterprise, dilute the value of the loan by issuing more debt to other lenders,
or divert the enterprise to more risky projects. 20 This may deter or reduce
precontractual investments on the lender's part, and it reduces the lender's
incentive to spend resources to evaluate the borrower's application in the first
place. On balance, then, the efficient rule for precontractual liability may
depend on whether it is more important to encourage borrowers or lenders to
make early reliance investments and on how close the debtor is to insolvency.
3. Broker-Customer Disputes
In Marchiondo v. Scheck,'2' the court used promissory estoppel to
protect a real estate broker who relied on the seller's offer to pay a
commission upon finding a buyer, even though the deal was never concluded.
This decision is consistent with the general rule of thumb. While the large
number of potential buyers, sellers, and real estate brokers prevents any single
one of them from gaining substantial market power, the central problem here
is appropriability of the reliance investment. The product of the broker's efforts
is largely informational; it is his job to discover and disclose the existence of
a buyer willing to pay the seller's price. Once this information is revealed, the
broker has given up most of the value of his work, and most of his bargaining
power. Even if the buyer's name has not yet been revealed to the seller, the
parties will now find each other more easily and the temptation to get together
behind the broker's back and cut him out of his commission will be
significant. This will, of course, undercut the broker's incentive to look for a
willing buyer in the first place. It is for this reason that real estate brokerage
contracts often provide the broker with exclusive agency rights for some
nontrivial period of time, 22 and it is for this reason that promissory estoppel
is appropriate to protect reasonable reliance by brokers before such contracts
are signed.
4. Employer-Employee Disputes
The strongest case for applying promissory estoppel to precontractual
negotiations may be in the context of labor contracts-specifically, the case of
the prospective employee who quits a previous job in reliance on a new
employer's offer, as in Hunter v. Hayes and Grouse v. Group Health Plan.
120. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE LJ. 131, 133-35 (1989).
121. 432 P.2d 405 (N.M. 1967).
122. See Real Estate Listing Serv. v. Connecticut Real Estate Comm'n, 425 A.2d 581, 584-85 (Conn.
1979) (discussing and comparing open-listing, exclusive-agency, and exclusive-right-to-sell arrangements).
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Except when the employee has some unique skill or professional knowledge,
the employer is much more likely to hold the bargaining power. After the
employee has given up the source of his livelihood, he will have limited
financial resources on which to draw. A period of unemployment may also
make it harder for him to find work in the future. Employers, in contrast,
generally have lower short-term costs of doing without an agreement and can
afford to be more patient. Because they deal with many employees while a
worker deals with relatively few employers, moreover, employers have both
the incentive and the ability to commit to an uncompromising reputation. They
can more easily claim the excuse of bureaucratic inflexibility and can more
credibly assert that a concession in one instance will cost them similar
concessions in the future. For all these reasons, holding employers to their
offers will most likely promote optimal reliance in employment negotiations.
C. Summary
In the foregoing examples, my suggested rule of thumb generally implies
holding large, informed, wealthy repeat players to their precontractual offers
and representations, while excusing small, uninformed, liquidity-constrained
novices from theirs. This favoring of weak parties over strong ones comports
with the traditional norms of equity out of which the estoppel doctrine
originally grew and may for some readers seem appealing for that reason. It
is important to remember, however, that my analysis here is not focused on
distributional fairness, but on allocative efficiency. Whether or not it is fairer
to favor weak parties over strong ones, it is necessary to do so in order to give
the weak appropriate incentives to make reliance investments-investments that
increase the social value of exchange for strong and weak alike. It is in the
private interests of the strong to enter into contractual arrangements whereby
they bind themselves not to use their bargaining power to expropriate the
investments of the weak. Who is strong and who is weak, however, and whose
investment incentives need protection, may be a matter for individualized and
decentralized determination.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
In summary, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not merely protect
the expectations of those who follow social and legal conventions. It also has
regulatory consequences, since it helps to set those conventions, and not all
conventions have similar effects. Specifically, by altering the costs and benefits
of reliance, promissory estoppel influences parties' decisions to make offers
and to rely on them at the proper time and in the proper amount. The
traditional approach to the doctrine, however, reflecting what I have labeled
convention maintenance, focuses on interpreting the context of the dispute to
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see what convention the parties agreed to follow. In so doing, this approach
neglects the regulatory consequences of promissory estoppel.
To give the traditional approach its due, convention maintenance may be
the only sensible policy if contracting parties cannot adapt their expectations
to the legal regime. For instance, individuals who have infrequent contact with
the legal system will find it costly and difficult to learn legal rules and to
adjust their behavior to them. They may rely inefficiently, notwithstanding any
regulatory incentives the law provides. For this reason, the analysis I
recommend will be more persuasive in some situations than in others. I am
inclined to think that parties in cases like Baird and Drennan can adjust their
expectations to the legal default rule fairly easily. Less experienced negotiators,
like the disappointed applicants in Hoffman, may have more trouble adjusting,
though a few costly mistakes might help to speed up the learning process.
Even in situations in which some parties are unsophisticated about what
the law provides, however, it is still useful for policymakers and planners to
consider a regulatory perspective, if only to understand what consequences
would follow from changing expectations. Only then will it be possible to
determine whether the better policy would be to defer to the expectations of
the untutored, to impose on them the burden of adjustment, or to require those
who deal with them to instruct them in the ways of the law. 23 Moreover, in
most of the cases that are close enough to make it into court, the regulatory
and interpretive approaches will overlap, since any reasonable interpretation
will be guided by the recognition that the legal system has been set up under
some rational regulatory scheme.
From the regulatory perspective, the key criterion in applying promissory
estoppel is whether or not it promotes efficient reliance. With regard to the
specific question of whether offers should be revocable, this means optimally
timed reliance-comparing the incremental value of waiting a little longer to
resolve some uncertainty with the incremental cost of delaying a productive
reliance investment. As I have argued above, the best way to promote optimal
reliance is to allocate the costs of wasted reliance to the least-cost avoider.
Other things being equal, this will be the party who holds the bulk of the
bargaining power. Sometimes this is the offeror, as when a large organization
revokes an offer of employment made to a liquidity-constrained worker who
has given up his previous source of income, as was arguably the case in
Hunter v. Hayes. But sometimes it is the offeree, as when a general contractor
controls access to a lucrative construction project and can play bidding
123. For a discussion of these switching costs from the economic viewpoint, how seriously they should
be taken, and who ought to bear them, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). For a critique from the liberal position of the economic approach to the
problem, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Ronald Dworkin.
Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980).
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subcontractors against one another, as was arguably the case in Baird and
Drennan.
The basis for this conclusion is that the party with the bargaining power
captures the bulk of the gains from reliance. If the same party is made to bear
the costs of reliance, including the costs of waste when the exchange cannot
be completed, she will have the proper incentives to weigh costs against
benefits. This will lead her to choose the timing of the transaction to maximize
the potential value of the exchange. If, however, the law places the costs of
reliance on a party who cannot capture its benefits, the incentives will be
inefficient. If it is the potential offeree who bears the costs of reliance but
cannot capture the benefits, he will want to delay reliance or avoid it
altogether. If instead it is the potential offeror who bears the costs without
being able to capture the benefits, she will want to delay or avoid an offer. The
argument needs to be modified when other complications such as asymmetric
information are introduced, but its underlying logic continues to hold. In
general, persons without bargaining power will be reluctant to enter
relationships requiring specific investments, for fear that their investments will
be expropriated. The proper allocation of contract and property rights,
however, can provide them with the necessary protection.
The rule of thumb I advocate here is best suited to questions of timing:
When should reliance take place, when should promises be communicated, and
when should an offer stick? Both parties to a transaction have good control
over its timing because of the sequential link between their actions. The
offeree can always avoid or delay reliance until the underlying uncertainty is
resolved or until the parties conclude a mutually binding agreement. Similarly,
the offeror can prevent premature reliance by delaying her offer and by
avoiding advance representations that an offer is forthcoming. Thus, either
party, if given the incentive to do so, can coordinate the optimal decision. If
the problem is not the timing of reliance but its amount, however, the offeror
may not have the same degree of control as the offeree; for that reason, the
suggested rule of thumb will not by itself produce a fully efficient outcome.
Instead, we will need to supplement it with other legal doctrines such as
misrepresentation, contributory negligence, unforeseeability, and the duty to
mitigate damages. The same is true if multiple reliance investments are
possible, if information about costs and benefits is not symmetrically
distributed, if the parties face different costs in bearing risks, or if they can
take precautions in advance to reduce the chances of a failed exchange. I have
focused here on timing because these other issues have been more thoroughly
covered in the existing literature, but maximizing the gains from exchange will
require trading off incentives along all the dimensions of efficiency.
From a purely legal standpoint, I have abstracted from some doctrinal
differences among the cases I have discussed, in order to focus on their
strategic structure. While the essence of the incentive problem is the same in
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the franchise, construction, and employment contexts, contracting parties may
be able to protect themselves more easily in some business and legal settings
than in others. If the reliance-inducing statement is specific enough to be
classified as an offer, for instance, as in the construction cases, the offeree can
protect himself by accepting, especially if there is room to condition the
acceptance on the award of the primary contract. But this tactic will not suffice
to protect the individual recipient of a job offer in a jurisdiction that recognizes
employment at will, since the employer retains the right to terminate for any
reason. And the franchise applicant who has not yet received any formal offer,
as in Hoffman, cannot accept at all. Similarly, it may be easier for the parties
to control reliance--either their own or the other side's-in some settings than
in others." 4
The basic lessons of the analysis, however, go beyond the confines of
Restatement (Second) sections 87 and 90, and apply to any analogous rules of
offer and acceptance. For example, the doctrine of indefiniteness, which holds
that an agreement leaving too many terms open cannot be enforced
notwithstanding the parties' actual intentions,12 presents a similar economic
problem. Early in the negotiating process, the parties have relatively poor
information about what terms of exchange are best. Thus, they face a trade-off:
They can transact using terms that run the risk of later turning out to be
inappropriate, or they can leave things open-ended until they know more
details. Waiting to be bound until everything is known forfeits the benefits of
reliance, if the relying party lacks bargaining power. If the legal regime
requires the parties to choose relatively specific terms in order to create an
enforceable bargain, as the common law traditionally did, they may get these
terms wrong; if the cost of wrong terms is too high, the parties may abstain
from the transaction entirely. On the other hand, if courts are prepared to fill
in gaps in the contract or to rewrite terms that turn out to be inappropriate, as
more modern doctrines and statutory provisions allow, early reliance may
become more worthwhile. 126 The obvious disadvantage of the modern, more
liberal approach is that courts may misunderstand the transaction and enforce
wrong and possibly inefficient terms. The analysis above suggests that if courts
are not in a position to regulate the substantive terms of the bargain or if the
parties are unable to supply such terms in the early stages of their negotiations,
they can at least promote efficient reliance by assigning the costs in the event
of waste to the least-cost avoider.
27
124. For instance, when reliance takes the form of contracting with a third party, as in the construction
cases, optimal reliance will require a second set of costly negotiations. The third party's own reliance also
becomes an issue.
125. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 3.27-.30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 33.
126. See, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 552 F.2d 447,454 (2d Cir. 1977) (enforcing promise
to grant liquor distributorship despite indefiniteness of location).
127. Similar arguments could be made in cases dealing with preliminary agreements or equivocal
acceptances, and regarding the rules governing parties who negotiate through correspondence. who need
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Since I have selected common law cases as my main examples, it might
be thought that my analysis is primarily directed toward courts and judges. But
this is not so. The intended audience is whatever legal decisionmaker might be
setting the framework that governs negotiations; depending on the
circumstances, this could be a court, a legislature, a trade association, or the
parties themselves through a letter of intent at the outset of their dealings. Who
should set the framework is a question of relative institutional
competence-one that I do not attempt seriously to address here. There are
good institutional arguments to be made for and against each of these possible
lawmakers. Courts have the advantage of deciding cases in hindsight, after all
the facts are revealed, and have no obvious economic stake that would bias
them toward one rule or another, but they lack expertise in the particular
subject of the exchange. Furthermore, it is questionable whether basing legal
outcomes on facts that are known only in hindsight can have much of a
regulatory influence on the actual incentives of the parties ex ante, who after
all must make their decisions based on the limited facts available to them at
the time. 28 For their part, the individual parties know the subject of their
bargain well, but they may not find it worthwhile to spend the time and effort
required to establish an efficient legal regime for the sake of a single
exchange. Parties engaged in repeated dealing, in contrast, may find it
worthwhile to invest in an efficient legal framework and to embody it in their
standard form contract, but they also have an incentive to include inefficient
one-sided terms in order to take advantage of smaller contractual partners who
trade less frequently and who find it costly to read and interpret standard
forms.'2 9  Private organizations such as trade associations may be
knowledgeable, concerned with transactional efficiency, and best positioned to
promulgate rules among their membership, but they are also inevitably tempted
to tailor their rules in the interests of restricting competition, and earning
oligopoly profits. The institutional implementation of a regulatory regime,
however, is a separate issue from its substantive content. In this Article, I have
focused on the latter issue rather than the former, subsidiary one.
Similarly, I have skipped over a number of other important issues relating
to implementation. I have not discussed whether disputes involving lost
reliance should be decided on a case-by-case basis or according to bright-line
to worry not just about the possibility that a revocation is forthcoming but also that one has already been
sent. For an economic discussion of this last doctrinal category, see Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for
Contract Formation by Promise and the Need for Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 KY. L.J. 557 (1991)
(analyzing rules from convention maintenance perspective); Avery Katz, Bargaining at a Distance: The
Economics of the Mailbox Rule (Aug. 28, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing
rule from regulatory perspective). For a fuller doctrinal survey of contract formation doctrines, focusing
on reliance incentives, see Craswell, supra note 64 (manuscript at 40-96, on file with author).
128. See generally Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 585, 600 (1985) (discussing appropriateness of liability rules that incorporate hindsight).
129. See Katz, supra note 1, at 272-93.
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rules. I have not analyzed the process by which private individuals might
contract around the legal framework set by courts and legislatures. Nor have
I discussed whether the framework should be made mandatory or merely
presumptive. The choice of substantive regulatory incentives, however, is
necessarily prior to such institutional discussions. Both Judge Hand in
Baird13o and Justice Traynor in Drennan3' made it clear that parties could
depart from standard interpretational conventions by being sufficiently explicit
in their communications, and I have assumed the same. As a general rule,
however, contracting around the legal convention is costly; it requires the
offeror to draft special language and to invest time and effort calling that
language to the offeree's attention. In cases in which the standard rule is
highly inefficient, these costs will be worth bearing, and it will be necessary
to take account of them when setting the proper background rule.
Furthermore, there is nothing in my analysis that would restrict it to
judicially enforced contracts. I assumed for the sake of concreteness that the
court-imposed liability and damage rules were actually effective in governing
the parties' relationship, and I ignored nonlegal incentives. But the analysis is
more general than this and could apply to any system of sanctions, private or
public. In many actual contexts, private sanctions may be more important to
the parties than public ones. Offerors who revoke after the offeree relies, for
instance, may find themselves the subject of a whispering campaign and may
suffer a loss of reputation. They may lose repeat business, miss out on
referrals, be hauled before arbitration tribunals, or face suspension of their
privileges within trade associations. 32 The substantive rules enforced by such
private contract regimes, furthermore, may differ from those enforced by the
public legal system. In this case, what courts or the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) do will make less of a regulatory difference. But my analysis would
still be useful in describing and evaluating the regulatory effects of whatever
private regime happened to be in force. 33 If those who design private
contract regimes want to promote efficient reliance, they should pay attention
to the factors identified above.
In practice, the actual implementation of any regulatory regime will be
imperfect. It is often difficult and costly to enforce one's legal rights after the
fact, even in the private arena. If offerees cannot prove the existence of an
offer or the fact of reliance at reasonable cost. they will not get in practice the
130. 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
131. 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958).
132. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 117-30 (1992).
133. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 83, 94-96 (1989) (making similar argument with
reference to whaling industry).
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protection that promissory estoppel affords them in theory.'34 In this case, the
regulatory effects of the legal regime will be less than my analysis would
suggest; and contracting parties may then want to arrange for alternative
commitment devices that help to enforce their promises by shifting the burdens
of enforcement, such as deposits, bonding, escrows, letters of credit, and direct
financing of reliance.
Additionally, courts or other third-party enforcers will tend to err in
applying liability rules and in measuring damages. To the extent that measured
damages systematically fall short of the theoretical ideal, the consequences can
easily be forecast by a straightforward extension of the basic analysis. If
reliance is less then fully protected, then parties who cannot capture its benefits
will underrely. Partial protection, however, is still better than none at all.
Conversely, overprotection and the resultant moral hazard may lead weaker
offerors to avoid preliminary negotiations, distorting or delaying reliance by
offerees. On the other hand, uncertainty in the measurement of damages or the
assignment of liability blurs the incentive effects of the various regulatory
regimes. Depending on the nature of the uncertainty, the parties may be led
either to take too many precautions to protect themselves against legal error,
or to take too few. 35 All these difficulties, of course, are what motivate the
least-cost avoider approach in the first place as a way of conserving
administrative costs and reducing judicial error.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the basic lesson is a robust one. The
rules of contract formation in general, and of promissory estoppel in particular,
affect reliance decisions through a common strategic pattern. At the outset, the
parties' background rights are established by the legal framework-specifically,
whether an offer or promise is binding as an option. In a second stage, the
parties choose whether and when to make relationship-specific investments. In
a third stage, after the uncertainty has been resolved, the parties decide how
to divide any productive surplus that results. The initial background rules
matter because they set the framework for the bargaining in the final stage,
which, along with the parties' relative bargaining power, determines the
incentives for specific investments in the interim. The exact process of
bargaining is inessential, as is the classification of the parties as offeror and
offeree, which may be a matter of arcane legal categories and in practice is
often an accident of the mails. Instead, what matters is who makes specific
investments, how productive they are, and who has bargaining power and
134. For economic discussions of the consequences of costly enforcement for the regulatory effects
of legal rules, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly
Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988).
135. For a fuller discussion and formal analysis of the problem of uncertain enforcement, see
SHAVELL, supra note 91, at 79-83; Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 279 (1986); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take
Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 437-39 (1989).
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information. These factors will determine which side is the least-cost avoider,
best able to weigh the costs of reliance against its benefits.
In sum, the protection of specific investments under conditions of
uncertainty has generally been understood to be an important function of the
law of contract. Many legal doctrines, such as duress, unconscionability, the
preexisting-duty rule for modifications, and the implied duty of good faith,
help to serve this purpose by regulating the opportunistic exercise of
bargaining power once negotiations are completed. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel, and other rules governing the effect of preliminary communications,
promote a similar purpose in the precontractual setting. Properly applied, they
can help to increase the potential surplus from exchange.
